Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Refutation of the Yogācāra Buddhist Doctrine of Vijñānavāda:

Annotated Translation and Analysis

Alex WATSON and Kei KATAOKA

南アジア古典学 第5号 別刷
South Asian Classical Studies, No. 5, pp. 285–352
2010年7月 発行

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Refutation of the Yogācāra Buddhist Doctrine of Vijñānavāda: Annotated Translation and Analysis

Alex Watson and Kei Kataoka[1]

INTRODUCTION

In the passage translated and examined below, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta[2] outlines, and then refutes, the doctrine of Vijñānavāda advanced by Yogācāra Buddhism.[3] The Vijñānavādin interlocutor first states his view as that it is cognition/consciousness (*vijñāna*) alone, appearing in a chain of individual moments, that manifests as the various objects that we perceive. Thus, he continues, there is nothing other than it, for if those things that we take to be external and insentient are actually of the nature of cognition, what need is there to postulate anything other than cognition?

Vijñānavāda is presented by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta as a kind of non-dualism, i.e. as holding that everything in the universe is of the same nature. He refers to it, both at the beginning and end of his presentation, as *vijñānādvaitavāda*, the doctrine of the non-dualism of cognition. He places his discussion of it after that of two other kinds of non-dualism: the non-dualism of Brahman and the non-dualism of 'The Word' (*śabda*). This discussion of three kinds of non-dualism comes within a chapter on liberation/beatitude (*mokṣa, apavarga*). This chapter is, in turn, one out of twelve in his *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyamañjarī*. The first six chapters of the *Nyāyamañjarī* concern themselves with the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the next three with the various objects of knowledge (*prameya*). The chapter on liberation is the third of these three, i.e. the ninth chapter of the whole text.

---

[1] The research for this article was enabled by a four week Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, in September 2009, when Alex Watson joined Kei Kataoka at Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.

[2] Although he is commonly referred to in secondary literature as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, he refers to himself as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in the two places we know of where he includes his own name within one of his texts: *Āgamaḍambara* 32,15 and 122,17.

For background information on Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, see Hegde (1983) and Dezső (2005: 15–22). On his importance for the reconstruction of various aspects of the history of Nyāya, see Oberhammer (1962), Wezler (1975) and Marui (2006). On the *Nyāyamañjarī* as a source of information about Buddhism, see Gupta (1963: 17–18), Kher (1992: 179–286), Shah (1997: 141–148) and Kataoka (2009).

[3] It is, to our knowledge, the first translation of the passage into a European language. For a Gujerati translation see Shah (1992). For a Japanese translation, see Kataoka (2006).

The *Nyāyamañjarī*

The *Nyāyamañjarī* is a 'selective' commentary on Akṣapāda's *Nyāyasūtra*, in the sense that it comments only on the sūtras that give definitions (*lakṣaṇasūtras*) leaving aside those that enunciate a topic to be further discussed (*uddeśasūtras*) and those that carry out an investigation of a topic (*parīkṣāsūtras*).

The following table shows the topics covered in its twelve chapters and the *Nyāyasūtras* that they are commenting on.

Chapter (*Āhnika*)	Sūtra, Topic	Volume, Page[4]
1	Introduction	I 1
	1.1.1 Enumeration of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*)	I 12
	1.1.3 What it is to be a means of knowledge (*pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇa*); subdivision into four kinds	I 31
2	1.1.4 Perception (*pratyakṣa*)	I 171
	1.1.5 Inference (*anumāna*)	I 282
	1.1.6 Comparison (*upamāna*)	I 373
3	1.1.7 Speech (*śabda*)	I 396
4	The Veda	I 573
5	Word-meaning (*padārtha*) and sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*)	II 3
6	Sentence-meaning	II 143
7	1.1.9 What it is to be an object of knowledge (*prameyasāmānyalakṣaṇa*); subdivision into 12 kinds	II 263
	1.1.10 The self (*ātman*)	II 278
8	1.1.11–21 The objects of knowledge from the body up to suffering (*śarīra–duḥkha*)	II 360
9	1.1.22 Liberation	II 430
10	1.1.23–39 The categories from doubt (*saṃśaya*) up to the final conclusion of a syllogism (*nigamana*)	II 522
11	1.1.40–1.2.17 Hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) up to unfair reply (*chala*)	II 584
12	1.2.18 Generality based on a false analogy (*jāti*)	II 645
	5.1.1–43 Subdivision into 24 kinds	II 646
	1.2.19–20 Grounds for defeat in debate (*nigrahasthāna*)	II 677
	5.2.1-24 Subdivision into 22 kinds	II 679

[4] Volume and page number in this table, and throughout this article, refer to the Mysore edition.

The chapter on Liberation in the *Nyāyamañjarī*

The chapter on liberation, taking up ninety-two pages in the Mysore edition, is effectively a commentary on just one sūtra (1.1.22), which defines liberation as the complete cessation of suffering (*tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ*). The contents of the chapter can be divided up as follows.

1 Explanation of the sūtra (*sūtravyākhyāna*) 430,3–431,13
2 The Nature of Liberation (*mokṣasvarūpa*) 431,15–439,18
3 The Means of Attaining Liberation (*mokṣopāya*) 440,2–460,11
4 Knowledge of the essential nature of reality (*tattvajñāna*) 460,13–461,5
    4.1 The Naiyāyika View (*naiyāyikamata*) 461,7–464,13
    4.2 Non-Dualism (*advaitavāda*) 464,14–15
        4.2.1 Non-Dualism of Brahman (*brahmādvaitavāda*) 464,17–476,12
        4.2.2 Non-Dualism of The Word (*śabdādvaitavāda*) 476,14–487,10
        4.2.3 Non-Dualism of Cognition (*vijñānādvaitavāda*)
            4.2.3.1 Perceptual Cognition (*pratyakṣavijñāna*)
            (translated in the present article) 487,12–504,17
            4.2.3.2 Erroneous Cognition (*bhramajñāna*);
            Theories of Error (*khyātivāda*) 504,19–518,13
            4.2.3.3 Conclusion of the Refutation of the Vijñānavādin
            view that Cognition is devoid of objects
            (*śūnyavādanirāsopasaṃhāra*) 518,14–519,11
        4.2.4 Conclusion of the Refutation of Non-Dualism
        (*advaitavādanirāsopasaṃhāra*) 519,13–16
    4.3 The Sāṅkhya View (*sāṅkhyamata*) 519,18–520,6
    4.4 The Jaina View (*jainamata*) 520,8–17
    4.5 The Yoga View (*yogamata*) 521,2–5
5 Conclusion of the discussion of Theories concerning Liberation
(*apavargavādopasaṃhāra*) 521,7–10

It having been established in section 4 that the means of attaining liberation is knowledge of the essential nature of reality (*tattvajñāna*), the question arises as to what precisely the object is of this knowledge. Jayanta first gives the view of his own Naiyāyika tradition, according to which liberating knowledge concerns the individual self (*ātman*) (4.1). Then he expounds and rejects the three above-mentioned kinds of non-dualism (4.2), followed by the Sāṅkhya (4.3), Jaina (4.4) and Yoga (4.5) views. It is striking that the Buddhist doctrine that Jayanta presents as most relevant to liberation is Vijñānavāda, not, as might

have been expected, the doctrine of no-self (*anātmavāda*). He deals with the latter view elsewhere (mostly in the seventh chapter), but the view that finds expression in the examination of Buddhist liberation is 'cognition-only'. The first half of this examination (4.2.3.1) deals with valid, perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣavijñāna*), whereas the latter half (4.2.3.2) deals with erroneous cognition (*bhramajñāna*). Both halves aim at establishing that the experienced form (*ākāra*) belongs to cognition, not to an external object.

The portion we translate is the first half, which, together with the first sub-section of the second half, was edited in Kataoka (2003). Those wishing to follow the Sanskrit should download the updated version of Kataoka (2003) from here:
<http://www.lit.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~kkataoka/Kataoka/NMvijR.pdf>.

Structure of the passage

Having looked at the place of our passage within the wider context of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, we now focus in on the passage itself. It consists of two main sections: the *pūrvapakṣa* in which the Vijñānavādin takes centre stage, and the *siddhānta* in which the Naiyāyika, Jayanta himself, refutes each of the points that have been laid out in the *pūrvapakṣa*. We have numbered these two sections 3 and 4, since they are preceded by two brief sections at the beginning of the passage, one (1) making clear the connection of this passage to the previous section of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and the other (2) narrowing down the precise issue that is to be decided in the ensuing debate to the following question: Do the forms we perceive belong to cognition or to an external object?

In the *pūrvapakṣa* section the Vijñānavādin gives five basic arguments:

1) The position that form belongs to cognition involves less postulation (3.1).

2) Cognition must be perceived before an object is perceived (3.2).

3.2.1 Because it is the illuminator;

3.2.2 Because there can be no obstacle to it being perceived;

3.2.3 Because we reflect on objects as dependent on cognition;

3.2.4 Therefore there is no need to postulate an object (separate from cognition) at all.

3) If form did not belong to cognition, there would be no way to explain how cognition is differentiated with respect to its particular objects (*pratikarmavyavasthā*) (3.3).

4) Cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*), therefore they are non-different (3.5).

5) Contradictory properties (*viruddhadharma*) cannot belong to one and the same object, but they can belong to different cognitions (3.7).

Two additional sections, 3.4 and 3.6 give Vijñānavādin refutations of Sautrāntika (Buddhist representationalist) views.

We divide the *siddhānta* into nine sections. The sections of the *pūrvapakṣa* that they are concerned to refute are given in the following table.

Siddhānta	Pūrvapakṣa
4.1	3.7
4.2	3.2
4.3	3.2.1
4.4	3.2.1
4.5	3.2.2
4.6	3.2.3
4.7	3.1
4.8	3.3
4.9	3.5

The *siddhānta* addresses only those sections of the *pūrvapakṣa* that argued against Brāhmaṇical realism; it does not concern itself with the two sections of the *pūrvapakṣa* in which the Vijñānavādin refuted Sautrāntika views.

We now give a detailed synopsis of the whole passage:

1 Connection with the previous section: 'Cognition-only' distinguished from other non-dualisms.

2 Doubt: Do the forms we experience belong to cognition or objects?

- 2.1 Objection from the Naiyāyika to the Vijñānavādin: Through direct perception etc. we grasp an object.
- 2.2 The precise issue that separates us
  - 2.2.1 If two forms appear, the Naiyāyika wins.
  - 2.2.2 If one form appears, does it belong to the object or cognition?

3 Pūrvapakṣa (Vijñānavāda): Form belongs to cognition.

- 3.1 Because it involves less postulation (*kalpanālāghavāt*)
  - 3.1.1 The Naiyāyikas postulate double what we do.
  - 3.1.2 No substantial difference between non-duality of object and non-duality of cognition

3.1.3 Cognition is established for both of us.

3.2 Cognition must be grasped first.

3.2.1 Because it is the illuminator

3.2.2 Because it must be grasped at the very moment that it arises

3.2.3 Because of reflection (*pratyavamarśa*) on an object as preceded by cognition

3.2.4 The relevance of cognition being grasped to the main issue

3.2.4.1 A grasped cognition has form.

3.2.4.2 An external object is therefore redundant.

3.3 Because cognitions could not be object-specific if they lacked form

3.3.1 A formless cognition could not be focused on one particular object.

3.3.2 Merely being caused by an object will not suffice.

3.3.3 Conclusion: Having a blue object is caused by having a blue form.

3.3.4 Consequence: Justification of the label *pramāṇa*

3.3.5 Even everyday usage attests to cognition having form.

3.3.6 Conclusion: The only way cognition could be delimited with respect to its objects is by having form.

3.4 The Vijñānavādin Refutation of the Sautrāntika View

3.4.1 The Sautrāntika View that the external object can be inferred

3.4.2 Cognition is not analogous to a crystal.

3.4.3 The appearance of two separate forms

3.4.4 The inference of an external object is not warranted.

3.4.4.1 Disagreement of name only

3.4.4.2 Explicability with the help of latent impressions

3.5 Because an object is necessarily perceived together with cognition

3.5.1 Because of positive and negative concomitance

3.5.2 Object and cognition are non-different.

3.6 Rejection of the Sautrāntika view that form results from contact

3.7 Contradictory properties

3.7.1 Cannot cohabit in single objects

3.7.2 But they can reside in different cognitions

3.8 Conclusion of the Pūrvapakṣa

4 Siddhānta

4.1 There is no non-difference between perceiver and perceived.

4.1.1 Because contradictory properties cannot exist together

4.1.2 Even Buddhists assume the difference of perceiver and perceived.

4.1.3 Forms appear to us as objects of illumination, not as illuminators.

4.2 The grasping of an object requires a perceiver; but that does not mean that the perceiver is itself grasped.

4.2.1 Objection: The appearance of the perceiver just is the appearance of the object.

4.2.2 Reply: Cognition, like the eye, is a means; means do not make the target redundant.

4.2.3 Objection: Eye and cognition are disanalogous.

4.2.4 Reply: An illumination is an illumination of an object, not of an illumination.

4.2.5 Objection: To see an object, cognition itself must be grasped.

4.2.6 Reply: The seeing of an object is the mere arising of cognition, not the grasping of cognition.

4.2.7 Objection: Then the presence or absence of the cognition would make no difference.

4.2.8 Reply: It makes a difference because the seeing of an object just is the occurrence of a cognition.

4.3 The instrumentality of cognition

4.4 Cognition's ability to illuminate

4.4.1 Interpretations of 'because it is an illumination'

4.4.1.1 Causal: because it makes manifest

4.4.1.2 Intransitive: being manifest

4.4.1.3 Synonym: being a cognition

4.4.2 There is nothing self-illuminating.

4.4.2.1 Objection: Three self-illuminating entities

4.4.2.2 Reply: The three require external factors.

4.4.2.3 Conclusion

4.4.3 Perception of the self is not a case of self-illumination.

4.5 Refutation of: 'cognition is grasped as soon as it arises because it does not depend on any further illumination and because there can be no obstruction'

4.5.1 A causal complex is required for cognizing a cognition.

4.5.2 The difference between Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya concerning the way in which a cognition is grasped

4.6 Response to the argument from reflection on an earlier cognition (*avamarśa*)

4.7 Response to the claim of less postulation

4.7.1 An external object is not postulated but directly perceived.

4.7.2 Response to the claim that cognition is established for both of us

4.8 Response to the argument that cognition's object-specificity implies that it has form

4.8.1 The object-specificity can be explained through causal link.

4.8.2 The restriction is based on the nature of things.

4.8.3 Proof that cognition is caused by an object

4.8.4 The whole causal complex is the most effective factor.

4.8.5 Conventional Expressions

4.9 Response to the necessary co-perception argument

4.9.1 If two things are actually one, how can they be 'together'?

4.9.2 They are not apprehended by the same cognition.

4.9.3 Vijñānavādins also accept the difference.

Jayanta and Kumārila (1)

We looked above at the synchronic context of our passage, i.e. its place within the *Nyāyamañjarī*; we now look at its diachronic context, i.e. its place within a debate that already had a history of over thee hundred years. Jayanta's most immediate influence in this debate is Kumārila. He draws so heavily on the *Śūnyavāda*[5] chapter of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, that a substantial portion of our passage consists of little more than paraphrasings of Kumārila's verses. Kataoka's (2003) edition includes in a separate apparatus those *Śūnyavāda* verses that are clearly sources of sentences in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. We give here a table of correspondences between the topics covered in the *pūrvapakṣa* sections of both texts.

The structure of Kumārila's and Jayanta's *pūrvapakṣas*

Ślokavārttika *śūnyavāda* verse	Topic	*Nyāyamañjarī* section
1–4	Connection with what precedes	1
	Surely your Vijñānavādin position is refuted by direct perception.	2.1

[5] The term *śūnyavāda* refers here not to the doctrine of emptiness of the Mādhyamikas, but to the view that cognition is 'empty of' / 'devoid of' objects (*arthaśūnya*), i.e. that it neither perceives, nor contains representations of, external objects. Kumārila uses the term because his *Śūnyavāda* chapter comments on the part of the *Śābarabhāṣya* that begins *śūnyas tu [pratyayaḥ]. katham? arthajñānayor ākārabhedaṃ nopalabhāmahe* (28,14). For more on the use of the term *śunyavādin* to refer to Yogācāras/Vijñānavādins rather than Mādhyamikas, see Watson (2006: 259, note 9).

5–9	Does form belong to cognition or object?	2.2
10ab	To cognition. For what reason?	3
10cd–12	If the external object is posited to have form, then a separate perceiver must also be posited.	3.1.1
13–14	If you try and avoid this double postulation by saying that the object is the perceiver, then we are disagreeing only about names.	3.1.2
15–17	Although cognition is transparent in nature, it appears as if variegated because of latent impressions.	
18–19c'	Cognition is established for both disputants, therefore attributing form to it involves less postulation	3.1.3
19c'–20	Even if you postulate an external object, you still have to postulate cognition with form.	
21–22	Cognition is the illuminator; therefore it must be grasped in order for the illuminated to be grasped.	3.2.1
23–27	There can be no obstacle to cognition being grasped at the very moment that it arises.	3.2.2
28–29	We reflect on an object as preceded by cognition.	3.2.3
30	Linguistic usage indicates that cognition has form.	
31	Cognition is grasped; and it cannot be grasped as formless.	3.2.4.1
32	Since a form-containing cognition is grasped, and since we only grasp one form, what need is there to postulate an external object?	3.2.4.2
33–34	Removal of possible objections to the argumentation in verses 31–32	
	If cognition lacked form, there would be no way to explain its object-specificity (*pratikarmaniyama*).	3.3
35–39	Refutation of the Sautrāntika view that an external object causes form to enter cognition	3.4
	Object and cognition are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*); therefore they are non-different.	3.5
40–55	Refutation of the Sautrāntika view that form is a product of the contact between object and cognition	3.6
56	Refutation of the Sautrāntika view that object and cognition, though distinct, are not perceived as such owing to their likeness	
57	Cognition does not depend on an object.	

58–61	Contradictory properties cannot belong to one and the same object.	3.7
62–63	Conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣa*	3.8

Empty boxes in the right-hand column indicate that Jayanta has ignored a section of Kumārila's; empty boxes in the left-hand column indicate that Jayanta has himself inserted a section that he has not inherited from Kumārila. There are three cases of the latter, but the first of these (section 2.1) is misleading for Jayanta is there summarizing the argument of Kumārila's *Nirālambanavāda* chapter. Thus it can be said that Jayanta derives the entire structure of his *pūrvapakṣa* from Kumārila, except for two extra sections that he inserts, one giving the argument from 'the object-specificity of cognition'[6] (*pratikarmavyavasthā*), and the other giving the argument from 'the necessary co-perception' (*sahopalambhaniyama*) of cognition and its object. As is well known, both of these arguments originate with Dharmakīrti, and indeed Jayanta cites Dharmakīrti in both of these sections.

These are not the only places where Jayanta 'updates' Kumārila's account by importing arguments from Dharmakīrti. For example his Sautrāntika-critique in section 3.4 hardly draws on the corresponding section in Kumārila, but focuses rather on the epistemological complications involved in inferring external objects as the cause of forms within cognition. Whether and how the positive and negative concomitance that would support such causation could be grasped, issues discussed by Dharmakīrti, take centre stage in this section which also cites Dharmakīrti. Similarly Jayanta's conclusion to the *pūrvapakṣa* does not draw on Kumārila's corresponding section, but outlines Dharmakīrti's specifically Yogācāra characterization of cognition's object, means and result, and of the non-difference of these three. Here too Dharmakīrti verses are cited.

In the first three out of these four cases, namely the arguments from *pratikarmavyavasthā* and *sahopalambhaniyama*, and the intricacies of the Sautrāntika inference of external objects, it can be said that Jayanta draws on Dharmakīrti for things that were either not elaborated at all, or not elaborated as systematically, by Dignāga.[7] Kumārila was aware of the ideas of Dignāga; his *Śūnyavāda* chapter takes account of them,[8] but it shows no familiarity with Dharmakīrti. The latter had become sufficiently prominent by the time of Jayanta for him to consider it necessary to insert into his account of the Vijñānavādin po-

[6] We borrow this felicitous expression from Birgit Kellner.

[7] The fourth point—Dharmakīrti's Yogācāra identification of the object, means and result of cognition—is already there in Dignāga, who Jayanta also cites in that final section.


[8] *Śūnyavāda* 25b'–27 seems to be based on the infinite regress argument at *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:12ab; *Śūnyavāda* 28–29 seems to be based on the memory argument for cognition being perceived at *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:11cd (see section 3.2.3 of the translation in this article).

sition those Dharmakīrtian innovations that were not present in Dignāga and hence not taken into consideration by Kumārila.

Just as Jayanta's response to Vijñānavāda was heavily influenced by a predecessor within his own Brāhmaṇical tradition, so Kumārila's response to Vijñānavāda was heavily influenced by a predecessor within his own Mīmāṃsaka tradition, namely the Vṛttikāra, on whose account in the *Śābarabhāṣya* his *Śūnyavāda* chapter comments.[9]

The Earlier History of the Debate

Our hypothesis concerning the history of this debate can thus be represented by the following diagram.



Buddhist authors are shown on the right; those who opposed them on the left. An arrow from one author to another indicates that the first influenced, or at least was taken into account by, the second.

Thus we posit Dignāga as the starting-point of this particular debate. Dignāga argues that cognition arises with a double-form; it contains within itself appearances of both subject and object.[10] The 'action' of cognizing does not in fact involve any activity (*vyāpāra*) at

[9] A complication should be pointed out here. The *Vṛttikāragrantha*—the section within the *Śābarabhāṣya* in which Śabara, having given his own commentary on sūtras 1.1.1–5, then cites the commentary of the Vṛttikāra—consists of a commentary on sūtras 1.1.3–5. But Kumārila attributes this *Vṛttikāragrantha*—apart from the very beginning portion which he comments on in the ten verses of *Ślokavārttika, vṛttikāragrantha* (Madras edition)—to Śabara, not the Vṛttikāra: see *Ślokavārttika, nirālambanavāda* 16; Jacobi (1911: 16) and Teraishi (1997). Kumārila's *Śūnyavāda* chapter thus comments on a part of it that he attributes (tendentiously) to Śabara.

[10] See *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad 1:9a (*dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca*) and ad 1:11abc. For a translation and analysis of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:8cd–12 and *vṛtti* thereon, see Kellner (forthcoming A).

all,[11] for the subject and object of that 'action' are not separate; they are merely two aspects of the same cognition. Nor is the means of cognition separate from the result; we are dealing with something which comes into existence fully formed as a unitary whole, and which only on the level of linguistic analysis can be divided into object, means and result. Insofar as these three can be separated, the object (*prameya*) is the object-pole (*viṣayākāra, grāhyākāra*) within cognition, the means (*pramāṇa*) is the subject-pole within cognition (*grāhakākāra*), and the result (*pramāṇaphala*) is the cognition's cognition of itself (*svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti*).[12] Thus there are two central theses of Dignāga's that remained relevant in the debate throughout the following centuries: cognition has two forms (subject-pole and object-pole) and it is self-cognized.[13]

The Vṛttikāra, probably in awareness of Dignāga, opposes Vijñānavāda by taking the following positions: It is external objects and not cognitions that have the forms (*ākāra*) we perceive. Our cognition is formless.[14] It is not cognized when it arises.[15] It is imperceptible.[16] He identifies the precise issue that differentiates the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka views as the question of what has the forms we perceive: objects or cognition. It is thus owing to him that the way the debate between idealism and realism in India came to be characterized was in terms of this question about *ākāra*. This was regarded as the crucial question by Kumārila and Jayanta for example.

Commenting on this passage of the Vṛttikāra, Kumārila both expounds and refutes the Buddhist view in more detail. Probably aware of Kumārila's criticisms, Dharmakīrti re-establishes the Buddhist view, primarily in the *Pramāṇavārttika*—a commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*—and the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Jayanta, as we have already seen, refutes the Buddhist view mainly by recourse to Kumārila's discussion, but also by expounding and responding to the post-Dignāga arguments introduced by Dharmakīrti.

Jayanta and Kumārila (2)

The previous table illustrated the structural relationship between Jayanta's and Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣa* sections by showing where their sections corresponded and where they did not. In order to facilitate a fuller picture of how Jayanta moulds and supplements his inheritance from Kumārila, that table needs to be supplemented by another showing those precise verses of Kumārila's whose wording Jayanta picks up on. We confine ourselves here too to the *pūrvapakṣa* section alone.

---

[11] See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:8cd and *vṛtti* thereon; and the *vṛtti* on 1:9d'.

[12] See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:10, which Jayanta cites in section 3.8.

[13] See *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad 1:11c: *tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca.*

[14] *Śābarabhāṣya* 28,17: *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ.*

[15] *Śābarabhāṣya* 28,20–30,1: *utpadyamānaivāsau [buddhir] jñāyate ... iti yady ucyeta, tan na;* 30,5–6: *pūrvaṃ buddhir utpadyate, na tu pūrvaṃ jñāyate.*

[16] *Śābarabhāṣya* 30,9: *apratyakṣā buddhiḥ.*

Nyāyamañjarī section	*Ślokavārttika* *śūnyavāda* verse
1	1
2.2	2, 6, 8–9
3	10ab
3.1.1	11
3.1.2	13–14
3.1.3	18–19c'
3.2	21a
3.2.1	21b–22
3.2.2	23–27, 191a
3.2.3	28
3.2.4	31–32
3.3.1	19c'–20
3.3.5	30
3.4.2	38
3.4.4	219cd
3.4.4.2	15–17
3.5.1	53
3.6	42, 47, 51
3.7.1	58–59, 61ab
3.7.2	61cd

The following two points, which become clear if the information in this table is combined with that in the previous, are to be noted.

1) Even the extra sections not found in Kumārila that Jayanta inserts himself, namely those concerning the arguments from the object-specificity of cognition and the necessary co-perception of object and cognition, draw on verses by Kumārila. This is a symptom of the fact that Dharmakīrti did not create these two arguments out of nothing; they had a pre-history part of which finds expression in the *Ślokavārttika* (in, for example, verses 19c'–20 and 53).[17]

[17] For more on the pre-history of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as reflected in Kumārila, see Taber (forthcoming); for the pre-history of the argument as reflected in Sadyojyotis, see Watson (2006: 260–269).

2) Jayanta sometimes borrows ideas from Kumārila but places them in completely different contexts to that in which they occur in the *Ślokavārttika*. The ideas expressed in verses 15–17 and 19c'–20, for example, are removed from their original home of the argument from economy of postulation, and placed by Jayanta in, respectively, his Sautrāntika-refutation and his argument from the object-specificity of cognition. Similarly the point made in verse 30 is removed from its role as an appendix to the argument from reflection (*parāmarśa*) on an object as subsequent to cognition and placed within the argument from the object-specificity of cognition.

Jayanta's area of greatest divergence from Kumārila is certainly his exposition and refutation of Dharmakīrtian arguments of which Kumārila was unaware. But his other innovations are not restricted to the moving around of what was already there in Kumārila. Sometimes he unpacks what is in Kumārila, making explicit what is implicit. At other times he adds in new steps not present in his source; new objections and responses are inserted into a sequence of argumentation that comes from Kumārila. Thus even in those places where he is clearly basing himself on arguments found in Kumārila, he exercises creativity in the way he expounds those arguments.

On one occasion (4.5.2) he disagrees with Kumārila. He temporarily suspends his Vijñānavāda-refutation in order to explain how his own Naiyāyika tradition diverges from the Mīmāṃsaka view that cognition is imperceptible and can only be inferred. But he then immediately states, 'Enough of this talk! Why at present do we have to attack a Brahmin colleague, letting a Buddhist off the hook?'

So he sees the differences between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā as insignificant when compared with the more urgent task of defeating the Buddhists; for that purpose the Mīmāṃsakas are important allies. Jayanta's final remark of the entire Vijñānavāda section demonstrates well his attitude towards the Buddhists.

> It is either 'empty'-minded people or charlatans who exhibit this attachment to the theory of the 'emptiness' [of cognition], not seers of reality. Therefore the theory of the non-duality of cognition, too, when investigated, turns out to be like a mirage[18] just like the theory of the non-duality of the Word and the like.[19]

---

[18] I.e. it does not stand up to scrutiny and it lacks a basis in reality.

[19] *Nyāyamañjarī* II p. 519.8-11:

> *sa eṣa buddhiśūnyānāṃ śūnyavādaparigrahaḥ* |
> *pratāraṇaparāṇāṃ vā na tu tattvārthadarśinām* ||
> *tasmāt parīkṣyamāṇo 'yaṃ śabdādyadvaitapakṣavat* |
> *vijñānādvaitapakṣo 'pi gandharvanagarāyate* ||

Conventions in the Translation

The translation is given in this font-size.

Interspersed with the translation are our comments and explanations, in this font-size.

The section divisions and the headings are not in the original; they are our own. Our intention in including them is to make the structure of the argument more explicit and the meaning easier to follow.

Philological points that are not pertinent to the interpretation of the argument have been separated off from the other (foot-) notes and put in endnotes.

Numbers separated by a colon refer to chapter and verse; those separated by a comma refer to page and line number; those separated by full stops refer to sections or sūtras.

Interpretative insertions required to complete the sense of a sentence are enclosed in square brackets. Explanatory insertions that go beyond what is necessary to complete the sense by giving additional information are inserted in round brackets. The former usually supply English words whose sense, though not explicitly expressed in the Sanskrit, is easily inferable from the context. There are some borderline cases where the choice between square and round brackets has been arbitrary.

We have not rendered *iti cet* when it merely indicates a speaker-change. We simply put in square brackets the name of the speaker each time there is a change, whether it is indicated by *iti cet* or not.

We have aimed for the admittedly extremely difficult, perhaps unachievable, goal of producing a translation that is sufficiently close to the Sanskrit for it to be clear what precise syntactic relationships we see in the original, yet at the same time is sufficiently 'readable' for those not comparing it to the Sanskrit to be able to follow the arguments.

In those cases where, for the sake of readability, we have opted for a somewhat free translation that does not make explicit how we have taken the Sanskrit syntax, we have included an endnote.

TRANSLATION[20]

1 Connection with the previous section: 'Cognition-only' distinguished from other non-dualisms.

Thus all the proponents of non-duality [who have been refuted in the previous section—Vedāntins who hold the non-duality of Brahman and Vaiyākaraṇas who hold the non-duality of the Word—] have become silent; the [Buddhist] proponents of the non-duality of *cognition*, however, assert themselves again against [us Naiyāyikas in the following manner]:

Here 'non-duality of X'—whether X = Brahman, the Word or cognition—means the view that everything in the universe is X.

[Vijñānavādin:] It is true that a [supposed] Brahman that lacks birth and cessation, that is single, unlimited and non-dual, is not logical, so it is absolutely reasonable not to accept it. But as for cognition (*vijñānam ... tu*)—which is momentary, *is* characterized by birth and cessation, and occurs sequentially in a beginningless stream—it alone (*eva*) appears in this and that way (i.e. as a pot, cloth etc.). Therefore we think that (*iti paśyāmaḥ*) other than it there is no second supposed [entity] in the form of an object.[21]

The Vijñānavādin puts his form of non-dualism forward as more logical than other forms, for he accepts just cognition, something readily accepted by everyone, not a fanciful metaphysical postulate, Brahman, supposedly untouched by characteristics we see everywhere such as coming into existence and ceasing. Cognition appearing in different forms is all that is needed to explain our experience.

2 Doubt: Do the forms we experience belong to cognition or objects?

2.1 Objection from the Naiyāyika to the Vijñānavādin: Through direct perception etc. we grasp an object.

[Naiyāyika:] But [we] have already shown[22] that what we experience, through valid means of knowledge such as direct perception, are the unique forms of objects which are

[20] The translation is based on the text as edited by Kataoka (2003), an updated version of which is available at <http://www.lit.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~kkataoka/Kataoka/NMvijR.pdf>.

[21] Jayanta is here echoing the wording of the Vṛttikāra: *tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīty paśyāmaḥ* (*Śābarabhāṣya* 28.15–16).

[22] In the context of refuting the Vedāntic non-dualism of Brahman earlier in this *āhnika*: *tasmād itaretaraviviktapadārthasvarūpagrāhitvān nābhedaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣam, śabdānumānayos tu sambandhagrahaṇādhīnasvaviṣayavyāpārayor bhedam antareṇa svarūpam eva nāvakalpata iti tāv ubhāv api bhedaviṣayāv eva* (*Nyāyamañjarī* II p. 471,9–12).

'Therefore perception does not have non-difference as its object, because it grasps particular forms of things that are distinct from each other. As for speech and inference, their very natures are

mutually dissimilar. So how can it be that it is cognition [rather than objects] that has this appearance, for in the absence of objects these unique forms would be impossible? For we term cognition the grasping of objects, not the grasping of grasping.

Jayanta has already shown, when arguing against Maṇḍana Miśra, that what we grasp through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and the other means of knowledge is differentiated (*bhinna*), not uniform. He points out here that if we do away with external objects, we do away with the obvious explanation of this differentiation. The implication is that cognition, as cognition, is the same with respect to all of its objects; plurality enters our experience because cognition confronts a plurality of objects. If all we encountered were cognition, we would experience an unchanging monotone or a mere blank, not the multi-coloured and constantly shifting forms that so obviously appear to us.

Jayanta concludes by pointing out that this process of apprehending a plurality of forms is what we term 'the grasping of objects'; we do not term it 'the grasping of grasping'.

2.2 The precise issue that separates us

[Vijñānavādin:] [We] reply [as follows]. First the following matter needs to be examined: Does one form appear or two in these perceptual cognitions—'this is blue', 'this is yellow'—which arise [for everyone]?

2.2.1 If two forms appear, the Naiyāyika wins

If two appear—'this is the object: blue' and 'this is its cognition'—then what is there to investigate in this matter? You will have won; please bestow on me the [punishment] that is appropriate for the defeated.

From here on the discussion proceeds on the assumption that only one form appears. Furthermore, Jayanta refers back to this section as stating that two forms do not appear (see footnotes 69 and 98). Thus even though this section does not explicitly refute the possibility that two forms appear, Jayanta sees it as denying that possibility by implication. That two forms appear to us is so clearly not the case that it can be dismissed just with this joke about the appropriate punishment for the defeated. If two forms appeared, there would be no room for investigation: the Naiyāyika position would obviously be correct. The reason that this whole debate arises is that only one form appears.[23]

---

not possible without difference, functioning as they do toward their own objects in dependence on the [prior] grasping of relationships [between plural items, i.e. words and meanings—in the case of speech—and logical reasons and properties to be proved—in the case of inference]. Therefore these two also certainly have difference as their objects.'

[23] The idea that we do not perceive two separate forms, one of the object and one of cognition goes back at least to the Vṛttikāra: *arthajñānayor ākārabhedaṃ nopalabhāmahe* (*Śābarabhāṣya* 28,14). It is voiced there by the Vijñānavādin opponent, so perhaps it goes further back to a Buddhist source known to the Vṛttikāra.

2.2.2 If one form appears, does it belong to the object or cognition?

If just one form appears,[i] then there is room for investigation: To what does this form belong? The object or the cognition? And when this form is thus investigated, if it be established that it belongs to the object, then you will win. But if the view that the form belongs to cognition [is established], we will be victorious.

The crucial point to be determined is whether forms we perceive such as 'blue' belong to an external object or to cognition itself. How does this bear on the Naiyāyika objection in 2.1? It renders it irrelevant by moving the debate to a more fundamental level. The fact that we perceive a plurality of different forms, which was given in 2.1 as a piece of *prima facie* evidence for the existence of objects external to cognition, can now be seen to be compatible with not only the Naiyāyika, but also the Vijñānavādin position. For if form belongs to cognition, we have an explanation of the plurality of our experience that does not require external objects.

The fact that we perceive a plurality of different forms was a better arguments against the view that we perceive only Brahman, for Brahman is one, formless and partless. But cognition is differentiated, and if it can include forms within itself, then perceiving only it is quite compatible with perceiving a plurality of forms.

Thus the debate earlier in this chapter of the text about whether what appears to us is non-difference (Maṇḍana Miśra's Advaita Vedānta view) or plurality (Jayanta's view) is now irrelevant, for the Vijñānavādin agrees with Jayanta on that point. The debate has shifted to a consideration of whether this plurality is best accounted for by regarding it as belonging to external objects or cognition itself.

3 Pūrvapakṣa (Vijñānavāda): Form belongs to cognition.

[Question:] First [then], which out of these [two views] is correct?

[Vijñānavādin:] [The view that] this form belongs to a cognition.

[Question:] Why?

3.1 Because it involves less postulation (*kalpanālāghavāt*)

[Vijñānavādin:] Because the extent of postulation is less [on our view].

3.1.1 The Naiyāyikas postulate double what we do.

To explain (*hi*), in the view that form belongs to the object, the object, being insentient by nature, is incapable of illuminating [itself]; therefore some other perceiver must necessarily be postulated, because otherwise the [insentient object] would not be grasped. Thus [in your position] there is double the postulation [that there is in ours].

3.1.2 No substantial difference between non-duality of object and non-duality of cognition

If it is maintained [by an opponent of our Vijñānavāda] that it is the [external] object itself, by nature an object of perception, that is the perceiver, then that [object] would be nothing other than the light [of consciousness], so the disagreement [between us] would concern names only.

What would the motivation be for an opponent to maintain at this juncture that the external object is the perceiver? The point is that such an opponent, despite being a non-dualist and thus avoiding the charge of postulating more than one thing, emphasizes the externality of that one thing. Thus he is in a position to hold that form belongs to something external without requiring any doubling of postulation.

[Objection:] There *is* a difference owing to [the fact that your cognition is] internal and [our non-dual object is] external.

[Vijñānavādin:] Oh you who are beloved of the gods, how knowledgeable you are about differences! The externality of a perceived object consists in its being separate from a perceiver;[ii] externality is not with respect to a body. And if the perceiver is held to be absolutely non-different from the object (*arthāt*), the perceived (*grāhyāt*), then the [object] (*asya*) would not be separate from the [perceiver] (*tataḥ*); so because it would not be external it would be nothing other than cognition. So how could this not be [merely] a dispute about names?

Even though a pot occupies a different spatial location from that of my body, if it were not separate from the perceiver it would not be external; it would be of the nature of cognition, which is precisely our Vijñānavādin position.

Who is this opponent who tries to differentiate his non-dualism from Vijñānavāda on the grounds that what he claims to exist is external? Jayanta is lifting this position from the discussion in the *Ślokavārttika*, and in Kumārila's time non-dualistic Śaivism had not yet developed. Perhaps Kumārila had in mind some strand of Vedānta according to which the 'external' world of perceived objects (*grāhya*) is real because it is identical with Brahman.

3.1.3 Cognition is established for both of us.

Because cognition is established for both [of us disputants], this form should belong to it. For about [the existence of] cognition, no one disagrees. Therefore it is rational that this form belong to cognition itself (*tasyaiva*). For [as is well known] 'Postulating one thing is better than postulating many'.[24]

The text returns here to the main issue, namely whether form belongs to the object or the cognition. The inference of this section (3.1) is that avoidance of unnecessary amounts of postulation leads to the conclusion that it belongs to cognition. The opponent holding the non-duality of the object posed a threat to

[24] Almost an exact quote of Kumārila. See *Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda* 18ab: *anekakalpanāyāś ca jyāyasī hy ekakalpanā.*

this inference, for though postulating only one thing, he was still in a position to attribute form to the object. Having dealt with that opponent, the Vijñānavādin can conclude this section by reaffirming his argument that if we want to avoid controversial postulation, we must assign form to cognition—for cognition is accepted by both sides, whereas an external object is not.

3.2 Cognition must be grasped first.

And for the following reason too this form belongs to cognition.

3.2.1 Because it is the illuminator

For you accept cognition to be the illuminator of objects that are devoid of illumination. And it follows from that that cognition (*asya*) must be grasped before an object [is grasped]. For we do not find that the light of things such as lamps is able to illuminate if it is ungrasped.

This is the first of three arguments (given in 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) for the conclusion that cognition must be grasped first, i.e. prior to the object. How this supports the main contention that form belongs to cognition is laid out in 3.2.4.

The argument here (in 3.2.1) can be divided into three:

[The assertion:]

Cognition must be grasped (first),

[The reason:]

because if it were not, it would not be able to grasp an object,

[The example:]

just like light, if it is not grasped, cannot illuminate an object.

What sense are we to make of the light example? Why is it the case that a light, in order to illuminate, must be perceived? John Taber (forthcoming) describes this assumption as 'highly questionable'. Commenting on the verses in the *Ślokavārttika*[25] that are the source of Jayanta's argument here, he writes:

> [I]t just doesn't seem true that one has to see the source of illumination in order to see objects illumined by it. All the time we look at objects illumined by the sun

[25] *Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda* 21–22:

> *itaś cākāravaj jñānam, yasmāt tad vaḥ prakāśakam* |
> *svayaṃprakāśahīnasya bāhyasyopāyasaṃmatam* || 21
>
> *na cāgṛhīte jñānākhye prakāśe 'rtho 'vadhāryate* |
> *tadadhīnaprakāśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ* || 22
>
> 21) And for the following reason too cognition has form. Because for you it is the illuminator; [you] hold it to be the means [of illumination] of an external object that is incapable of self-illumination.
>
> 22) And if the light of cognition is not perceived, its object is not apprehended, because [the object's] illumination is dependent on that [cognition], just like a pot [is not apprehended] if the light of the lamp [is not perceived].

and other luminous bodies without also apprehending those sources of illumination. In the case of the moon, most of the time it isn't even possible to apprehend the sun which is illumining it, for it is blocked by the earth.

How are we to respond to the undeniable truth of Taber's point here that we can see an object without seeing the source of the light that illuminates it? We could simply take it as a refutation of the Vijñānavādin argument and move on. But then we would be left with no sense of why the Vijñānavādin thinks that light must be perceived in order to illuminate. We see two possible explanations:

1) An invisible flame, or other light-source, would lack the power to illuminate. A flame cannot reveal objects without revealing itself in the process. If a person has an unobstructed view of the flame, they will see it. Of course it may be outside of their field of vision or obstructed; thus all that can be said is that the flame makes itself visible, not that it *must* be perceived. The example is thus not quite strong enough to secure the conclusion that cognition must be perceived in order to cognize an object; but the Vijñānavādin could respond that no example is parallel in all ways to the exemplified, and in this case there is indeed the difference between cognition and light that whereas the former is always perceived when it reveals objects, the latter is always perceived when it reveals objects except when it is out of view.[26]

The problem with this explanation is that what the Vijñānavādin actually says here is that an unperceived (*agṛhīta*) light cannot illuminate. We either have to take this literally, in which case it is false; or we have to assume that *agṛhīte* is used loosely to mean not unperceived, but imperceptible. The claim about light then becomes true (an imperceptible light cannot illuminate); but it is sufficient only to prove the weak conclusion that cognition is perceptible (which is anyway acceptable to the Naiyāyika), not the Vijñānavādin's stronger conclusion that cognition must be perceived. But there is a second explanation which avoids these problems and has other advantages.

2) When the Vijñānavādin talks of the necessity of the light being perceived in order for it to illuminate, he is talking not of the source of light, the lamp, but rather the 'light of the lamp'[27] that spreads out from its source to the object that it illuminates. If the object in question is the wall in front of me, I have to see the light between me and the wall before I see the wall, even if the source of that light is out of my field of vision. In what sense do I see the light as well as the wall? The space between me and wall is experienced as full of light, given that it (the space between me and the wall) looks very different in the dark.

As evidence that light was considered to be visible not only at its source such as a flame, but also in the form of rays spreading out from there, see *Nyāyavārttika* ad 3.1.38. Light (*tejas*) is there considered to be a substance whose two qualities, colour and temperature, can either be manifest or unmanifest. In the case of a ray of the sun, both are manifest; in the case of a ray of light, the colour is manifest but the temperature unmanifest. Hence both of these kinds are visible by means of their colour. In the case of

---

[26] In the very next sentences of the text the Vijñānavādin argues that whereas *objects* can be present yet unperceived owing to an obstruction, cognition cannot be occurrent yet unperceived. It is not inconceivable that he was motivated to place that argument there in order to acknowledge, but render harmless, the disanalogy between *light* and cognition. In other words, suspecting that the Naiyāyika may object that the light may not be perceived, he rules out this possibility in the case of cognition. The Vijñānavādin argument would be tighter, however, if both light and cognition contrast with objects on the grounds that they both, unlike objects, cannot be present yet unperceived; this is the case if we interpret the Vijñānavādin argument according to explanation 2 given below.

[27] This phrase reflects Kumārila's *dīpābhāse* and Jayanta's *dīpādeḥ prakāśasya*, where we take the genitives as *vyadhikaraṇa*.

the eye's *tejas*, i.e. the ray of light that enables us to see specific objects, its colour (and temperature) are unmanifest, hence it is invisible.

This interpretation avoids the problems of the previous: *agṛhīte* can be taken literally,[28] and there is no longer the disanalogy between light and cognition that the former may not be perceived if obstructed, but the latter must be perceived. It also has the additional advantage that, unlike the previous, it offers an explanation of why cognition, like light, is perceived *before* the object is perceived. The light is perceived first because it is always between me and the object, i.e. it is closer to my eyes. That cognition is perceived first is the conclusion that the light example is introduced to instantiate, yet on the previous interpretation this crucial aspect of the conclusion is not represented in the example.[29]

3.2.2 Because it must be grasped at the very moment that it arises

And even if objects such as a pot arise [in front of us] we will not perceive them when there is a lack of illumination or when we are inconvenienced by an obstacle [between us and the object][30] (*pratibandhakavaidhuryāt*).[iii] But as for cognition, once it has arisen, there can be no obstacle to its being perceived. And [cognition] does not depend on another illumination, because like a lamp its very nature is to shine forth by itself.

The first sentence gave two reasons why we might not perceive something that is present in front of us: an obstacle or a lack of illumination. That the first of these cannot apply to cognition was stated in the second sentence—after all between me and an object there is a gap where an obstacle may be located; but between cognition and itself there is no such gap.[31] The third sentence explains why the second cannot apply either: because cognition provides its own illumination and thus does not require any other.

Therefore at the precise time when it arises, it is necessarily grasped. If it were not [grasped when it arises], it would not [be grasped] at any subsequent time either. For what could occur for it at a subsequent time, as a result of which it be grasped at that subsequent time? Or what did not occur for it at the time that it arose (*tadā*), as a result of which it was not grasped then?[32]

---

[28] The Vijñānavādin restates the point about light during the refutation of this argument in section 4.2.3 of the *siddhānta*: *na cāgṛhītaḥ prakāśaḥ prakāśyaṃ prakāśayati.* Again the literal meaning is that unperceived light cannot illuminate, not that imperceptible light cannot illuminate. Thus it would be extremely surprising if 'imperceptible' were the intended meaning.

[29] That the intended conclusion of this argument is not just that cognition is grasped, but that it is grasped first is confirmed by the way the argument is summarized at the beginning of section 4.4 in the *siddhānta*: *yad api prakāśatvāj jñānasya pradīpavat pūrvaṃ grahaṇam uktam, tad api vyākhyeyam.*

[30] See Kataoka (2006: 75, note 20) for the point that the pairing of these two conditions, absence of light and presence of an obstacle, goes back to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

[31] For more on the impossibility of any obstacle or distorting factor intervening between cognition and its awareness of itself, see Watson (forthcoming).

[32] Jayanta summarizes this argument in section 4.5 of the *siddhānta* before refuting it: *yad apy abhihitam—utpadyamānam eva jñānam anapekṣatvād apratibandhatvāc ca tadaiva gṛhyate, na vā kadācit—iti, tad api na sāmpratam.*

[Naiyāyika:] It can be grasped by another cognition at the subsequent time.

[Vijñānavādin:] And that [other cognition] will be grasped by what?

[Naiyāyika:] By [yet] another [cognition].

[Vijñānavādin:] Then it too [will be grasped] by yet another [cognition]. So what limit [can there be]?

[Naiyāyika:] Fatigue [will be the limit].

[Vijñānavādin:] As you like. When exhausted you can take rest. But you will not have grasped an object, because as long as the illumination remains ungrasped, it is impossible to discern things illuminated by that. Thus the grasping of the object could never occur.[33]

For the object to be grasped, its cognition/illumination has to be grasped. Let us term this C, the condition that has to be met. Can it not be objected by the Naiyāyika that the illumination of the object *is* grasped in the very first moment after the object is grasped (T_2), so that surely then the object can be grasped? The Vijñānavādin would respond by re-applying C to the illumination of the object. If that becomes the new object, then it follows from C that it has not yet been grasped at T_2, because *its* illumination has not yet been grasped. Thus we have to wait until the illumination of the illumination of the object has been grasped before the object can be grasped, and so on. In this way, C entails that unless the illumination of the object is grasped at exactly the time that it arises, the grasping of the object is postponed forever.

Therefore even those who hold that we grasp an external object must necessarily resort to an earlier grasping of cognition.

---

[33] Jayanta's immediate source for his recounting of this famous infinite regress argument is Kumārila (*śūnyavāda* 28):

> *jñānāntarasya cotpattiṃ prakāśo na pratīkṣate*
> *tasya tasyāpi cānyena saṃvittāv asthitir bhavet* ||
>
> And the illumination of that [cognition] does not wait for the rise of another cognition; [for] given that that [other cognition] would also be experienced by [yet] another, there would be an infinite regress.

Kumārila was, in turn, drawing on Dignāga (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:12ab): *jñānāntareṇānubhave 'niṣṭhā.* See Ganeri (1999) and Kellner (forthcoming B) for discussions of Dignāga's argument.

Kumārila's *siddhānta* is that a cognition may or may not be cognized (through *arthāpatti*) by a subsequent cognition; that subsequent one may then, or may not, be cognized by a yet subsequent one, and so on. When the agent becomes fatigued (see *yāvac chramam* in *śūnyavāda* 191a) by reflecting on their cognition, their cognition of that cognition etc., they cease to do so. The process comes to an end and there is no infinite regress. Jayanta takes this point about fatigue from Kumārila's *siddhānta* section and places it his own *pūrvapakṣa* section, where we have just encountered it. He prefers to allow the Vijñānavādin to overcome the point within the *pūrvapakṣa*, rather than using it as an unchallenged argument against the Vijñānavādin in the *siddhānta* section, as it is for Kumārila.

Note that what this argument (i.e. that given in this section 3.2.2) establishes is that cognition is grasped at precisely the same time that it arises: see *ato yadaiva tasyotpādaḥ, tadaiva grahaṇam avaśyaṃ bhavet* above, and *utpadyamānam eva jñānam ... tadaiva gṛhyate* in the summary of this argument in section 4.5 of the *siddhānta* (given in footnote 32). Yet immediately after the argument has been given we find it stated that cognition must therefore be grasped earlier, i.e. prior to the object. Jayanta does not state why it follows from cognition being grasped at precisely the time it arises that it is grasped prior to the object. The reason is included in the version of the argument given by Kumārila's Vijñānavādin however (*śūnyavāda* 25):

> *prāk cārthagrahaṇād iṣṭā tasyotpattis tadaiva ca |*
> *saṃvedanaṃ bhaved asya, na cet kālāntare 'pi na ||*
>
> And the rise of the [cognition] is accepted to take place before the grasping of the object; and at the very time [that cognition arises] it must be experienced, otherwise it never could be.

Thus we have the missing link in the argument: cognition arises before it grasps its object. This is also stated by the Vṛttikāra.[34] It could be seen to be suggested by the light example: after a match is struck in the dark, or a light is switched on, the light will then take a small amount of time to travel to the objects it will illuminate. See also Taber's (forthcoming) comment on the just-cited *Ślokavārttika* verse to the effect that it is a Mīmāṃsaka principle that something must exist before it can exercise its function. He points to *Ślokavārttika, pratyakṣasūtra* 54ab (which is translated and commented on at Taber 2005: 67).

As [Dharmakīrti] has said:[35]

> For someone whose perception is imperceptible, [even] the seeing of an object cannot be established.

3.2.3 Because of reflection (*pratyavamarśa*) on an object as preceded by cognition

For the following reason too it is the case [that cognition must be grasped first]: because after [cognizing an object], we find that we reflect [on that object] (*avamarśadarśanāt*) as preceded by cognition (*jñānapṛṣṭhena*). To explain (*hi*), when knowers reflect, 'this object was cognized by me', they are remembering (*anumodante*)[36] first a grasping of cognition [and only after that a grasping of the object]. For there can be no cognition of something qualified[37] whose qualifier has not [first] been grasped.[38]

---

[34] *pūrvaṃ buddhir utpadyate* (*Śābarabhāṣya* 30,4).

[35] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:54cd. For a discussion of other possible syntactical interpretations of this half-verse, see Watson (2006: 206) and Kellner (forthcoming B). For a list of places where it is cited, see Steinkellner (2007: 40). Some other citations not mentioned there are found at: *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, p. 12,13; ad 1:27c–28b, p. 61,1; Jayaratha's commentary ad *Tantrāloka* 10:96c–97b, p. 75,1; *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* ad 2069, Vol. 2, p. 705, 17.

For other places where Dharmakīrti makes the point that cognition of an object necessarily entails cognition of cognition, see *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:443ab and 3:446. See also *Tarkabhāṣā* 17,8–18,16.

[36] Literally, 're-enjoying'.

[37] In this case 'this object' (*ayam arthaḥ*).

Jayanta's formulation of this argument is elliptical. Our interpretation of it is influenced by his immediate source for the argument, namely *Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda* 28–29 (cited in footnote 43), and by a parallel argument that he gives at *Nyāyamañjarī* II 277,3–9 (cited in footnote 112). At time T_1 there was a cognition (C) of an object (O). At T_2 we reflect 'this object was cognized by me' in which O features as the qualified (*viśeṣya*). What is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*)? To judge from the verbalization of the reflection, one might expect: the fact that the object has been cognized previously by me. But it is clear that it is being understood to be the previous cognition itself (C).

Once C has been identified as the qualifier and O as the qualified, the Vijñānavādin can appeal to a general Naiyāyika principle to establish that the reflection includes a memory of C before its memory of O. The principle, stated in the last sentence of the text, is that if the qualifier has not been grasped, the qualified cannot be grasped. You cannot cognize someone as a 'stick-carrier' (*daṇḍin*), i.e. as qualified by a stick (*daṇḍa*), unless you have cognized the stick that they are carrying.[39] Similarly if you are experiencing O as having been cognized, i.e. as qualified by C, you must have just cognized, i.e. remembered, C. If we assume that our memory can be trusted, then it follows that the structure of the memory, in which first C is remembered and then O is remembered, replicates the structure of the earlier experience. Thus we can know that this earlier experience at T_1 involved not only a grasping of O, but first a grasping of C, followed by a grasping of O.

What is happening at T_1 is not clear at that moment: is there first/just a grasping of O (as according to the Naiyāyikas) or is there first a grasping of C (as according to the Vijñānavādins)? It only becomes clear in the light of the evidence at T_2. The fact that at T_2 the awareness of C precedes the awareness of O indicates that in the original experience at T_1, an awareness of C precedes the awareness of O.

From this too[40] it is established that first there is a grasping of cognition.

Jayanta's immediate source here, Kumārila, was in turn probably basing himself on Dignāga's argument at *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:11cd:[41] 'And because of memory at a subsequent time [cognition has two forms and is self-cognized], for memory (*asau*) is not possible with regard to something that has not been experienced.' The *-vṛtti* explains 'And because, after an experience, memory arises of the cognition as well as of the object, cognition has two forms and is self-cognized'.[42] Since we have memory of the cognition, the cognition must have been experienced earlier.

Kumārila writes,[43] 'And as for reflection on the form of the object as preceded by cognition, which occurs later, even in the absence of the object—how would that be possible if the [reflecting-]cognition did

[38] This argument is summarized at the beginning of section 4.6 in the *siddhānta* before being refuted: *ataś ca yad uktaṃ jñānapṛṣṭhāvamarśadarśanāj jñānagrahaṇapūrvakam arthagrahaṇam iti, tan na sārvatrikam.*

[39] You can, however, cognize that something is a stick without cognizing the person carrying it.

[40] I.e. from this argument in 3.2.3 as well as those given in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The *api* correlates this sentence with *tataś cārthāt prathamataram asya grahaṇena bhavitavyam* in 3.2.1 and *tasmād ... pūrvaṃ jñānagrahaṇam avaśyāśrayaṇīyam* in 3.2.2.

[41] *smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca na hy asāv avibhāvite* ||

[42] *yasmāc cānubhavottarakālaṃ viṣaya iva jñāne 'pi smṛtir utpadyate, tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca.*

[43] *Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda* 28–29:

jñānapṛṣṭhena yo 'py ūrdhvaṃ arthābhāve 'pi dṛśyate |
parāmarśo 'rtharūpasya, sa kathaṃ copapadyate ||

not arise having depicted an object of that form [within itself], and if in the past (i.e. at the time of the original cognition) the object had not been perceived as preceded by cognition (*tatpūrvam*)?'

Kumārila there derives two conclusions from two features of reflection: 1) Cognition arises containing the form of an object, for we can reflect on the form of an absent object; 2) At the time of the original cognition the object was perceived as preceded by cognition, for we reflect on the object later as preceded by cognition.[44]

Kumārila's first conclusion is more or less equivalent to Dignāga's conclusion of cognition having two forms. His second conclusion is more or less equivalent to Dignāga's conclusion of cognition being self-cognized; for if an object is perceived as preceded by cognition, cognition must have been cognized. Kumārila thus makes clear what may not have been clear from Dignāga's argument, namely why it proves that cognition has two forms. It does so, according to Kumārila at least, because the fact that we can remember an object when an object is not there shows that the form of the object must be contained within cognition at that time.[45]

What then are the differences between the two arguments? 1) Where Dignāga talks of *smṛti*, Kumārila talks of *parāmarśa*. 2) Dignāga's argument is based on the fact that we remember the cognition (as well as the object). From this he concludes that we must have experienced the cognition. Kumārila's argument is based on the fact that we remember the object as preceded by cognition. From this he concludes that we must have experienced it as preceded by cognition.

Jayanta ignores Kumārila's first conclusion. He mentions neither the fact that the object is absent at the time of the reflection, nor the conclusion of cognition containing form. He concentrates exclusively on establishing that cognition is grasped prior to the object being grasped. His argument is essentially the same as Kumārila's argument for that conclusion, but he clarifies what could be regarded as obscure in Kumārila: in what sense do we reflect on the object as subsequent to cognition? His answer amounts to: we reflect on it as cognized, i.e. as qualified by cognition. Since cognition is the qualifier, it follows from the maxim about qualifier and qualified that it must have been grasped first—both in the memory and in the original experience.

3.2.4 The relevance of cognition being grasped to the main issue

3.2.4.1 A grasped cognition has form.

And cognition, being necessarily grasped[iv] [as a result of the three previous arguments], cannot be grasped without some form, so certainly it must be grasped with form.

---

tadrūpam ārtham ālikhya yadi dhīr nopajāyate |
bhūtakāle ca yady arthas tatpūrvaṃ nopalakṣitaḥ ||

[44] We were helped in our interpretation of these two verses by Taber (forthcoming), who drew our attention to Umbeka's division of the features of the reflection into two, one yielding one conclusion, and the other yielding the other.

[45] It might be objected that Dignāga intended his conclusion of cognition having two forms to follow from the fact that the original experience was of both an object and cognition. But this would be an insubstantial argument: the fact that an experience is of an object does not entail that it has that object as a form within itself. Dignāga does not give required supporting arguments that would indicate this to be his intention.

The argument here could either derive from what is hypothetically possible or from what is empirically observed. 1) If cognition lacked form, what would there be to grasp? It would be completely transparent, like empty space. 2) We do not remember mere cognitions, but always a cognition *of something*.

3.2.4.2 An external object is therefore redundant.

And given that a cognition with form is grasped, how can there be some external object separate from that cognition, for we do not grasp a second form?

So Jayanta has now stated the relevance of the arguments in 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Since we know from those three arguments that cognition is grasped, we can know that it has form. Since it has form, we have no reason to accept the existence of an external object, for we do not grasp two forms.[46]

This argument goes back not only to Kumārila (see the apparatus to the edition), but also to the Vṛttikāra. He writes, 'We do not perceive different forms, one of the object and one of cognition. And for us cognition is perceived/perceptible. Therefore as we understand it there is no supposed [entity] of the nature of an object which is separate from cognition (*tadbhinnam*).'[47] This is the principle Buddhist argument in the Vṛttikāra's *Śūnyavāda* section.

What Jayanta's argument adds is the idea that cognition is grasped before an object is grasped. This idea is also there in Kumārila, but it is more emphasized by Jayanta: it is mentioned in all three of the arguments leading up to this section, in the paraphrases of these arguments at the beginning of sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6, and in the paraphrase of this 3.2.4 argument at the end of section 4.6.[48] What precise role does it play? Surely the argument does not require it, for given that we only grasp one form, the mere fact that we grasp cognition with form is enough to establish that we do not grasp an object that is separate from cognition. And if we grasp cognition, then we must grasp cognition with form. That may all be so, but the point of Jayanta's arguments for cognition of an object requiring a prior cognition of the cognition is that they support the contention that we grasp cognition. Much weight hangs on this contention: the argument fails, in fact does not even get off the ground, without it. Hence in order for the Vṛttikāra's argument to be strengthened, his contention that cognition is grasped (*pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*) needed to be strengthened.

That cognition first grasps itself and then an object is not actually the Vijñānavādin's own view. Given that for him

1) the object is nothing other than cognition
2) we do not perceive two forms

there is simultaneity in the grasping of object and cognition.

---

[46] The argument thus moves from the fact that cognition is aware of itself to the conclusion that cognition has form, and from there to the denial of the existence of external objects. For more on the relationship between the first of these two, *svasaṃvedana* and *sākāravāda*, see Watson (forthcoming: section 3).

[47] *arthajñānayor ākārabhedaṃ nopalabhāmahe. pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ. atas tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīty paśyāmaḥ* (*Śābarabhāṣya* 28,14–16).

[48] *arthagrahaṇāt pūrvaṃ jñānasyāvabhāsān nirākāratvāvasāyavirahāc ca, jñānasyaivāyam ākāraḥ.* 'Because a cognition appears before grasping an object, and because there is no determining of it as devoid of form, this form belongs to cognition alone'.

The necessity of cognition being grasped first is an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) that results from the Naiyāyika/Mīmāṃsaka presuppostion that objects are of a different nature than cognition;[49] it is just a temporary stage in an argument that is followed by: we only perceive one form, therefore let's forget about an external object. The Vijñānavādin *siddhānta* is that there is no temporal difference, but that if there were an external object, it would have to be perceived later.

3.3 Because cognitions could not be object-specific if they lacked form

3.3.1 A formless cognition could not be focused on one particular object.

For the following reason too cognition has form: because if it lacked form, [it] could not be differentiated with respect to its objects.[50]

It would be impossible for one cognition to be of blue and another of yellow, etc. All cognitions would be the same.

Even if [you] postulate an external object, [you] will [anyway] necessarily have to teach that a cognition has form in order to establish that it is limited by its object [and thus distinguishable from cognitions of other objects]. For how [if it lacked form] could this cognition of blue, arising in the presence of many [things], become (*-tām avalambeta*) attached to blue alone by excluding all of the things other than blue (*taditara*); for [its] being a cognition by nature does not vary with respect to all [of its objects].?[v]

Given that cognition arises in the presence of many things, the fact that it has a particular intentionality can only be explained by it having a particular form. For if its nature consisted merely in being a formless cognition, it would stand in the same relation to all the things in whose presence it arose; nothing would link it to its specific intentional object and exclude it from other objects on which it is not focused.

And how could the activity of those who act judiciously[vi] be properly focused on that [blue object] alone?

Not only cognition, but also activity, could not be focused on particular distinct objects if the cognitions of those objects did not have their form.

3.3.2 Merely being caused by an object will not suffice.

And it would not be right to say that being *caused* by blue does produce this [required] limitation on a cognition of blue (*tadadhigati*), because given the fact that [the cognition] is also caused by other causal factors (*kāraka*) such as light and eyes,[vii] it would undesirably follow that it had those as its objects [too].

---

[49] This *prasaṅga*-nature is most clearly indicated by, in the *Ślokavārttika*, verse 21 (given in footnote 25), and in this text, the first sentence of 3.2.1.

[50] The argument of this section comes from Dharmakīrti. See *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:34–37 and *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:301–319; Jayanta cites 3:302 below in 3.3.3.

The Vijñānavādin here anticipates and rejects the Naiyāyika view that sinee cognition's object-specificity can be accounted for by the fact that it is caused by its particular object, we do not need to resort to the assumption of form within it.

The Naiyāyikas conceptualized the relationship between object and cognition as that of producer (*janaka*) and produced (*janya*). The background model is that of the Grammarians, according to which the action denoted by a verb—in this case the action of cognition denoted by 'cognize'—is brought about by *kārakas*, the various causal factors that together produee an action. Dharmakīrtian Buddhism opposed this approach by denying that any action is involved in cognition and maintaining that the object and the so-called 'means' of cognition, far from pre-existing the cognition and causing it to come into being, occur simultaneously with it and are not separate from it. Rather than cognition being a dynamic process beginning with means and object and ending with result, namely cognition of that object, it is a static (*nirvyāpāra*) state. It is preceded and followed by similar static states, but in each one there is simultaneity of 'means', result and object-form.

What allows cognition to be object-specific is thus not that it is brought into existence by a pre-existing object, but simply that it arises with its object as its form. The relation between object and cognition, rather than being one of producer and produced is merely one of specifier (*vyavasthāpaka*) and specified (*vyavasthāpya*).

It was Dharmakīrti's commentator Dharmottara who introduced the precise terminology of *vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva* (relation of specifier and specified), contrasting it with *janyajanakabhāva* (relation of producer and produced).[51] It is possible that Jayanta's account in this section (3.3) and the corresponding refutation in section 4.8, in which he uses expressions such as *pratikarmavyavasthā* (three times) and *nīlaviṣayatvavyavasthā*, has been influenced by Dharmottara. Kataoka (2009) has shown that Jayanta knew Dharmottara's writing, which was already suggested by the fact that Jayanta gives the name Dharmottara to the Buddhist-monk character in his play, *Āgamaḍambara*, and is not surprising given that Dharmottara took over from Dharmākaradatta = Arcata (ca. 730-790) as the foremost commentator on Dharmakīrti in Jayanta's area of residence, Kashmir.[52]

3.3.3 Conclusion: Having a blue object is caused by having a blue form.

Therefore it is [cognition's] possession of a blue form—no other cause—that explains [its] particular distinguishing feature of having a blue object. And [Dharmakīrti] says:[53]

> A cognition [focused] on that [blue object] (*tatra*), having a similar nature [to other cognitions of other objects] in terms of it being [like them] a cognition, must have a nature by virtue of which it is differentiated in accordance with its object.

---

[51] See, from Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*: *na cātra janyajanakabhāvanibandhanaḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ ... api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena* (cited at Tosaki 1979: 397, note 7).

[52] Jayanta uses the expression *pratikarmavyavasthā* as though it were a technical term despite it not occurring in Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti does use *vyavasthāna* in this context however in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:37 = *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:308.

[53] *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:302. See also *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ad 1:34, p. 31,4–5: *tatrānubhavamātreṇa sadṛśātmano jñānasya sarvatra karmaṇi tenātmanā bhavitavyam, yenāsyedam iti pratikarma vibhajyate.*

If the natures of cognitions were restricted to just the fact that they are cognitions, and did not include what they are cognitions of, they would all be alike and so a cognition of blue would be indistinguishable from a cognition of yellow.

3.3.4 Consequence: Justification of the label *pramāṇa*

For this very reason,[54] cognition alone, as the *most* effective [factor] (*sādhakatama*), can [justly] become a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*),[55] given that (*sati*) when this very taking on of form is resorted to as its preeminence (*atiśaya*) [over other factors], the meaning of the word 'most' (*-tamab*) becomes justified.

For something to be a *pramāṇa* it must be the most effective factor that brings about a valid cognition. And for something to be the most effective factor it must have some preeminence that the other factors lack. If we accept that cognition takes on form then we can regard that as its preeminence, setting it apart from other factors, and we thus have some justification for it and not them being a *pramāṇa*.[56]

For otherwise, since we would find no preeminence in [any] causal factor (*kāraka*), it would be hard to justify that [any causal factor] (*tat*) is the most effective one.

If cognition were not capable of taking in form, none of the *kārakas*, whether cognition devoid of the ability to take on form, or others put forward by other schools as the most effective causal factor and thus as the means of producing knowledge (for example *indriyārthasannikarṣa*, contact between sense-faculty and object, put forward by the Naiyāyikas) would have any preeminence. Hence there would be no justification for any of them being the 'most effective one', hence there would be no justification for any of them being the means of knowledge.

The reason that Jayanta puts this point into the mouth of his Vijñānavādin opponent may be that he in fact agrees that there is no justification for any single *kāraka* being the most effective one. This argument thus gives him a hook onto which he can hang his response in the *siddhānta* section (4.8.4) that the means of knowledge is not any single *kāraka*, but the whole causal complex. It makes no sense, for

---

[54] I.e. because cognition can have a particular form and thus grasp a particular form.

[55] Grammarians define an instrument as the most effective factor in bringing about an action (see *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.42: *sādhakatamatvāt karaṇam*). Debates in philosophical texts over what being a *pramāṇa* consists in often appeal to its being the most effective factor (in bringing about knowledge) as a result of being an instrument. Kellner (forthcoming A) suggests that the earliest instance of this may be *Nyāyavārttika* 6,7ff. ad 1.1.1.

[56] See *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:311 (and Tosaki 1979: 404):

> *sarveṣām upayoge 'pi kārakāṇāṃ kriyāṃ prati* |
> *yad antyaṃ bhedakaṃ tasyās tat sādhakatamaṃ matam* ||
>
> Although all causal faetors contribute to an action, the most effective one is held
> to be the last and the one that particularizes (*bhedakam*) the [action].

Dharmakīrti mentions two conditions that must be met for something to qualify as the most effective factor and hence as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). 1) It must come last in the time-line before the arising of the resulting action, not separated from it by any intervening obstacle (see *vyavadhāna* in 3:310); 2) it must particularize the resulting cognition, determining that it is of blue and not of yellow, for example. Possession of the form of the object (see *meyarūpatā* in 3:306 and *viṣayābhāsatā* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:9c) is the only thing that meets these two conditions.

Jayanta, to isolate one of them as the 'most effective', given that if any one of them is removed the result would not come about.

3.3.5 Even everyday usage attests to cognition having form.

And even worldly, everyday utterances exist that attest to cognition having form. And (*ca*)[57] people speak in the following way, 'This is a blue object because in [my mind] a cognition with that form has arisen'.

3.3.6 Conclusion: The only way cognition could be delimited with respect to its objects is by having form.

Therefore cognition must necessarily have form[viii] because otherwise it would be impossible for it to be delimited with respect to its objects.

> Thus even if an external object exists, a form within cognition must be postulated.
> So it is better to stop right there, being satisfied [with cognition alone].[58]

3.4 The Vijñānavādin Refutation of the Sautrāntika View

3.4.1 The Sautrāntika View that the external object can be inferred

There are those[59] who [argue as follows].[ix] Because cognition has a transparent nature of itself, the appearance [in it] of blue, yellow and the like must have something other than [cognition] as the cause of its particularity (*upādhi*), just like lac or some other [red thing placed behind a crystal] implants redness into the crystal.

It may look like the redness belongs to the crystal, but it is actually implanted there by something other than it. Similarly it may seem like the forms we perceive belong to our cognitions, but since cognition is transparent by nature, they must be implanted there by something other than it.

---

[57] The *ca* makes little sense here; *hi* would be more appropriate. The *Ślokavārttika* verse on which this is based (*Śūnyavāda* 30) includes a *ca*:

> *vaktāraś cāpi dṛśyante vartamānārthabuddhiṣu* |
> *"nīlo 'rtho 'yaṃ, yato me 'tra tadrūpā jāyate matiḥ"* ||

It is possible that this has influenced Jayanta.

[58] A similar expression is found in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (Vṛttikāra's commentary on 1.1.5, p. 52,6–7): *tato vijñāna eva parituṣya tāvaty eva virantum arhasi*. 'Therefore you should rest content with cognition alone and stop at that point.'

[59] Namely Sautrāntikas.

Therefore, even though an external object is not experienced separately,[60] it is inferred because without it the appearance of a cognition with a certain form (*sākārajñāna*) would be impossible.

We experience various images. These could be produced in two different ways: by cognition itself or by objects external to cognition. The former is ruled out by the fact that cognition is transparent by nature. Therefore external objects must be inferred as the only possible explanation.

In previous sections the Vijñānavādin has been arguing against the Naiyāyika position that the forms we perceive belong to external objects. He has aimed simply at establishing that the forms we perceive belong to cognition, for establishing that much undermines the Naiyāyika position. But it does not undermine the Sautrāntika position, which for that reason now needs to be addressed; for the latter holds that even though cognition has forms, external objects are to be inferred as the causes of those forms.

As [Dharmakīrti] has said:[61]

> External [objects] can be established from negative concomitance.

I.e. from the fact that when there is no external object there is no internal image, just as, in the case of the crystal, when there is no red object there is no redness appearing in the crystal.

3.4.2 Cognition is not analogous to a crystal.

[Vijñānavādin:] This [inference] is impossible, because one cannot apprehend the positive concomitance.

I.e. the fact that when an external object is there, a cognition having an image of that object appears. We cannot determine that, because we never see an external object alongside but separate from cognition, in the way that we do see fire alongside but separate from smoke.

> For where did the proponent of the view that the external object can only ever be inferred observe cognition with a form when an object is present[62] and without a form when the [object] has gone[63]?[64]

The Vijñānavādin's main point seems to be that the positive concomitance cannot be known, for that is how he introduced the verse. But in it he claims that the negative concomitance cannot be known ei-

---

[60] But only via a cognition having its form.

[61] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:58c'd.

[62] This is the positive concomitance. We are dealing here with causal, rather than logical, concomitance; in other words the analogous positive concomitance in the case of fire and smoke is not 'when there is smoke, there is fire', but 'when there is fire, there is smoke'.

Once a causal relation has been established by causal concomitance, the logical concomitance can be known. For exactly how a causal relation is established according to Dharmakīrti, see Inami (1999).

[63] This is the negative concomitance.

[64] Jayanta has already given this verse in the first *āhnika* (Vol. I, p. 41,14–15), in the context of *sākārajñānavāda* being put forward as a way of establishing that the *pramāṇaphala* is not different from the *pramāṇa*.

ther. How does the Sautrāntika think that the negative concomitance can be known? Probably not through, as this verse characterizes it, perceiving a cognition without form when no object is there, but rather through the hypothetical consideration that if there were no object there would be no cognition with form.

With regard to lac and crystal and the like, on the other hand, it is appropriate [to view the situation] in that way,[65] because [in that case] we see that the chunk of crystal is reddened by the [lac].[x] In this case [of an object and cognition] however:

> It is obvious (*khalu*) that we do not have experience of cognition as coloured by some [external] object[66] or as lacking form by nature,[67] in the way that [we do experience] a crystal [to be coloured by an object, namely] lac [and to be transparent by nature].[68]

---

[65] The two most plausible candidates for interpreting 'in that way' (*tathā*) are 1) 'as having positive concomitance that is perceived', contrasting with *anvayānupalabdheḥ* before the verse; and 2) 'as having both positive and negative concomitance that are perceived' contrasting with the verse. The rest of the sentence (which mentions only what is relevant to the positive concomitance) weighs in favour of the first. But in favour of the second is *lākṣayā sphaṭikaṃ yathā* at the end of the next verse, which implies reference to both the positive and negative concomitance (see the translation of it below), and which seems to have an exactly parallel role to the *tathā* here. Of course it makes little difference which is intended.

[66] Because we cannot see beyond the cognition to any external object.

[67] This expression—*nirākāraṃ nisargataḥ*—resembles *svataḥsvacchasvabhāva-*, 'having a transparent nature of itself', above. But note that the Vijñānavādin, as becomes clear below (3.4.4.2), accepts that cognition is *svataḥsvacchasvabhāva*. How can that be reconciled with the present point? Two different possibilities suggest themselves.

1) Here he emphasizes the fact that we do not *experience* cognition to lack form by nature. He knows it to do so through scripture or though hypothetical considerations. On this view his disagreement with the Sautrāntika concerning the negative concomitance can be seen to be slight; and this may explain why he introduces the first verse as asserting disagreement regarding the positive concomitance alone.

2) Although both he and the Sautrāntika agree that cognition is *svataḥsvacchasvabhāva*, their disagreement concerning the negative concomitance is considerable. The Sautrāntika holds that when no object is there, cognition lacks form. The Vijñānavādin holds not only that this cannot be experienced, but also that it is not true; for him even when no external object is there, cognition has form caused by latent impressions. So for him cognition's having a transparent nature (*svacchasvabhāva*) means that these latent impressions do not form part of its nature; it does not mean that it lacks form when no external object is there. To answer the question then of how, on this view, the present claim is reconcilable with his later claim that cognition is transparent by nature: here he is denying that absence of external object means absence of a form in cognition; there he is asserting that latent impressions are only a surface mud that does not affect cognition's transparent nature.

[68] We can see the crystal to be coloured by the lac, because it is possible to see the lac separately if we remove it from behind the crystal; and we can see that the crystal is transparent by nature by taking the lac away.

Does this verse say anything that has not been said in the previous verse and the intervening prose? The only possible difference we can discern is that, since the subject of the previous verse is the Nityānumeyabāhyārthavādin, i.e. the Sautrāntika, and the subject of this one is 'we', which could be taken as 'we Vijñānavādins', Jayanta may have intended the previous verse as a kind of *prasaṅga* following from the Sautrāntika view that the external object can only be inferred, never experienced, and this one as stating the Vijñānavādins' own view: the Sautrāntikas, as a result of their own presuppositions, should not be able to experience the positive or negative concomitance; and neither can we experience them.

3.4.3 The appearance of two separate forms

[We do not experience the positive concomitance] for as we have already said[69] two different forms do not appear.

If as well as experiencing an image within cognition, we had a second perception of the external object directly, we would have grounds for asserting the positive concomitance. Thus although the Sautrāntika has not previously put forward the idea of two separate forms, one of the object directly and one belonging to cognition, the Vijñānavādin argues against such a view here, and the Sautrāntika defends it later in this section.

Or if [two forms] were accepted, it would be difficult to reply to the critique that infinite regress [results]. If one teaches that the form of the object is directly perceptible, and the form of the cognition, caused by that [object] is also perceptible, then [the following chain of reasoning is unavoidable]. The form of the object, first of all, is grasped by a cognition with form. Now the form of the cognition also, since it is grasped,[70] must be grasped by some further cognition with form. Thus there is an infinite regress (*aniṣṭhā*).[xi]

[Sautrāntika:] Let the cognition with form [that grasps the object] be held to be self-illuminating, then it will not depend on a further cognition, so there will be no infinite regress.

The Sautrāntika defends the position that we have two cognitions, one of the form of the object and one of the form within cognition. But the second cognition does not require a third cognition in order for it to be cognized for it is cognized by itself through self-illumination. Hence the infinite regress is averted, but the separate experience of the form of the object is preserved.

[Vijñānavādin:] In that case we should just accept the self-illuminating, form-containing cognition alone, for there is no appearance of a form of the object separate from that.[xii] Now [that you are accepting that the form-containing cognition is self-illuminating], for what reason [do we need] a second form belonging to the object?

The first of the two cognitions, that of the form of the object, is redundant, for the second cognition contains within itself the form of the object.

---

[69] See section 2.2.1.

[70] That it *is* grasped follows straightforwardly from the opponent's claim that we grasp not only the form of the object but also the form of the cognition (*ākāradvayapratibhāsa*).

3.4.4 The inference of an external object is not warranted.

And even[71] postulating the [form of the object] on the grounds that [the appearance of images in cognition] would be impossible without it[72] is not appropriate. For it is not a royal decree that an object must have form. What crime would result if it were cognition alone that had blue and the like as its forms?

3.4.4.1 Disagreement of name only

[Sautrāntika:] Because [what we experience] is connected with forms such as blue, it is the object.

The Sautrāntika here abandons the position that we experience two forms, accepts that we experience only one, but prefers to label the possessor of that form as the object. When we interact with the forms we perceive we think we are interacting with objects, not with our own cognition, so why can we not use the word 'object' for the possessor of the forms we experience?

[Vijñānavādin:] In that case the disagreement [between us] concerns names [only], as I have said,[73] for [we both accept that] there is no second [form].

In section 2.2.2 the Vijñānavādin stated that if only one form appears, then the crucial issue is whether it belongs to the object or to cognition. If the former, then the Vijñānavādin loses the debate. Is that not contradicted by his attitude here that there would be no substantial difference between his own position and that of form belonging to 'the object'? No, because the Sautrāntika-type view that is being put forward here accepts that 'the object' which has form does not fall outside cognition.

3.4.4.2 Explicability with the help of latent impressions

[Sautrāntika:] Because cognition is transparent, its 'dirt'[74] must be caused by something else.

[Vijñānavādin:] It can be caused by latent impressions of ignorance. Cognition, although transparent of itself, being weighed down by the force of beginningless latent impressions of ignorance[xiii] appears as if its body were contaminated by the mud of many forms.[xiv] And because the succession of the various cognitions and the succession of the various [corresponding] latent impressions[xv] are, just like sprouts and seeds, beginningless, there is no occasion to ask, 'From where does the latent impression arise'?

---

[71] The function of 'even' (*api*) is to mark the contrast between the previous sentences rejecting that a form of the object separate from the form of cognition *appears* to us, and this sentence rejecting that such a form of the object can be *inferred*.

[72] As the Sautrāntika did above in 3.4.1: *ataḥ pṛthag ananubhūyamāno 'pi bāhyo 'rthaḥ sākāra-jñānāvabhāsānyathānupapattyānumīyate.*

[73] In section 3.1.2 an opponent put forward the same kind of view as the Sautrāntika advances here, and the Vijñānavādin maintained, as here, that what resulted was a disagreement about names only.

[74] For example blueness.

Since the Vijñānavādin assigns to latent impressions full responsibility for explaining how forms occur in cognition even without any external objects, it is natural to ask where latent impressions come from. But for the Vijñānavādin latent impressions and cognitions are analogous to sprouts and seeds, or chickens and eggs; all that can be said is that they come from each other and have done so beginninglessly.

So because it is possible that the variety of [forms in] cognition are created by the variety of beginningless latent impressions, let's be done with an external object, even one that is [only] inferable. Thus it is established that this form belongs to cognition alone.

3.5 Because an object is necessarily perceived together with cognition

For the following reason too it is to cognition that this form belongs.

3.5.1 Because of positive and negative concomitance

For without cognition nothing of the nature of an object (*artharūpa*) is experienced anywhere. But cognition is clearly experienced even when there is no [external] object [but there is a perceived form] as in the case of mirages,[75] illusions etc. Thus we know that form belongs to cognition also through positive and negative concomitance.

The negative concomitance was expressed in the first sentence: when there is no cognition, there is no experience of any form. The next sentence implied the positive concomitance: when cognition is there, forms are perceived. The qualifier 'even when there is no external object' serves to exclude the possibility that it is not cognition, but an external object, to which the forms of the mirage and the like belong. Again we are dealing with causal, not logical concomitance.

3.5.2 Object and cognition are non-different.

And if an object had a nature that existed separately from cognition, then it would be experienced even without a cognition. But this is not the case. Therefore cognition and object are non-different. As [Dharmakīrti] has said:[76]

> Blue and its cognition are non-different, because they are necessarily perceived together.

3.6 Rejection of the Sautrāntika view that form results from contact

And form cannot be an [emergent] property of the contact between cognition and object.

This is a Sautrāntika view, advanced in the *Ślokavārttika*, according to which we experience representations that arise from objects and cognition coming into contact. The difference from the Sautrāntika

[75] The word (*gandharvanagara*) actually refers only to one kind of superior mirage, namely Fata Morgana.

[76] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:54ab.

view refuted earlier is that these representational forms belong not exclusively to cognition, leaving external objects as merely inferable, but jointly to both the cognition and the external object. Rather than being located within consciousness, they are located at the meeting-point of consciousness and external object.

For if we [first] experienced separately an object without form and cognition without form, and then experienced the cognition and the object, when in contact, to have form, then from that we could accept this form to be an [emergent] property of the contact. But this sequence [of experiences] does not exist.

Furthermore, we have already said that cognitions such as remembering and dreaming do have form, even though they lack a [corresponding external] object.[77] So how could form be an [emergent] property of contact.

If form required contact to emerge, we would not be able to explain its existence in dreams and the like, where cognition is not in contact with any object.

3.7 Contradictory properties

3.7.1 Cannot cohabit in single objects

Moreover, how can mutually contradictory genders cohabit in a single object [denoted by the words] *nakṣatram, tārakā and tiṣyaḥ*?

The three words are, respectively, neuter, feminine and masculine, and yet they can all be used to refer to stars.

And for a wandering mendicant, a male lover and a dog, how can a single thing, namely a woman, become the object of three different perceptions: a corpse, a female lover and food?

The example is an old one and commonly used. See the citations from the *Ślokavārttika*, *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* and elsewhere in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, given by Kataoka in the apparatus to the edition. It is not clear whether the woman is envisaged as being dead or alive. The fact that the dog regards her as food suggests that she is dead. Perhaps the mendicant is meditating on her corpse in order to deepen his sense of the transitoriness and unsatisfactoriness of *saṃsāric* existence. Perhaps the recentness of her death explains why the man still sees her as his lover. Alternatively, though she is alive, the mendicant may see her as a corpse in order to enhance his dispassion (*vairāgya*); and the dog may see her as a potential giver of food.

[77] What he actually said (in 3.5.1) was that cognitions of things such as mirage-towns and illusions have form, even though they lack a corresponding external object. In speaking here of remembering and dreaming he is drawing on *Śūnyavāda* 51 cd: *smṛtisvapnādibodhe ca syād anākāratā tava* || 'And for you memories and dream-cognitions should be devoid of form [since you hold form to arise from contact between cognition and object, and there is no such contact in those cases].'

How can a single individual woman become the referent of a masculine plural form in the case of *dārāḥ* ('a woman')? And how can things be singular and of feminine gender, when they are [elsewhere] plural and of a different gender[78] as in the case of *ṣaṇnagarī*[79]?

And [finally] how can one of the two forms 'short' and 'long', which are grasped relative to each other, be located as real in a [single] object?

It makes no sense to call an object long per se, because there will be some objects in comparison to which it is short.

We have had three kinds of case: words of contradictory gender and number seemingly referring to the same object; widely divergent perceptions seemingly of the same object; and pairs of contradictory attributes applying to a single object, in that in comparison to some things it is one, and in comparison to others it is the other. The contradictory words, perceptions and attributes cannot, and thus do not, belong to or refer to one and the same object for the Vijñānavādin, for one and the same thing cannot have contradictory properties.

3.7.2 But they can reside in different cognitions

In the case of cognitions, however, there is no contradiction, because they are different [from each other], arising in accordance with the various different latent impressions that have the role of their co-operating causes.

There is no contradiction in the sense that the contradictory properties no longer belong to the same thing. They belong to different cognitions. And why should not cognitions be different given that they are conditioned by different latent impressions?

The words *nakṣatram, tārakā and tiṣyaḥ* are the contents of, and signifiers within, separate cognitions; they do not all denote one and the same object. *nakṣatram* appears in one cognition and *tārakā* in another because those two cognitions have different latent impressions conditioning their arising.

The fact that the mendicant, the lover and the dog all perceive the woman's body so differently would be puzzling if the nature of their perceptions were determined by the selfsame external object. It becomes easily explicable if the forms they perceive belong not to one and the same object but to their individual cognitions, each of which will be shaped by different latent impressions.

The idea 'short' arises from someone's subjective judgment, it is not a property that belongs to an independently existing external object, for in that (in fact non-existent) locus it would be contradicted by opposite properties.

3.8 Conclusion of the Pūrvapakṣa

Therefore this [world that we experience] is nothing but cognition, which appears everywhere in a different way. Other than it there is no such thing as an object. And this everyday interaction involving[xvi] 'means of knowledge', 'object of knowledge', and 'knowl-

---

[78] Namely neuter (*nagarāṇi*).

[79] 'Six towns': feminine, singular.

edge [as result]' is [all] completed within a single entity, namely cognition alone.[80] For its having the form of an object is the 'object of knowledge', its having the form of the perceiver is the 'means of knowledge' and self-cognition is the result. As [Dignāga] taught:[81]

> The appearance that [cognition] has (*yadābhāsam*) is the object of cognition (*prameya*). And cognition's means (*pramāṇa*) and result (*phala*) are respectively the form of the perceiver and [self-]cognition. Therefore, these three (i.e. cognition's object, means and result) are not separate from one another.

Therefore it is this cognition alone which—since its seeing of its essence is overturned by the coquetry (*vilāsa*)[xvii] of latent impressions of beginningless ignorance[xviii]—is looked upon as if it is divided into perceiver, perceived and perception. But once ignorance has ceased, it becomes absolutely transparent. Or nothing [is left].[82]

This has been said [by Dharmakīrti]:

> There is nothing else [other than the cognition itself] that is experienced by a cognition.[83] The experiencing of that [cognition] is not another [cognition], because of the absence of an object to be grasped and a grasping subject [in that case too].[xix] It alone shines forth by itself.[84]
>
> Although the nature of cognition is undivided, it is experienced by those whose seeing is mistaken as though it were divided into perceived, perceiver and perception.[85]

The three stand for *grāhyākāra, grāhakākāra* and *svasaṃvitti*—the object, means and result of cognition (*prameya, pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*).

---

[80] The Vijñānavādin is here deliberately disagreeing with the view put by Vātsyāyana at the beginning of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, and defended by Jayanta earlier in this text, that all of these three (*pramāṇa, prameya, pramiti*) plus the agent of knowledge (*pramātṛ*) are separately existing categories which together do not form a single entity, and which are all required for everyday interaction (*vyavahāra*). For more detail on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* passage, and Jayanta's commentary on it, see endnote xvi.

[81] *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:10

[82] Jayanta often mentions these two possibilities as the two conceptions of *nirvāṇa* that Buddhists offered. See for example *Nyāyamañjarī* II p. 439,4–5: *nirvāṇādipadākhyeyam apavargaṃ tu saugatāḥ* | *santatyucchedam icchanti, svacchāṃ vā jñānasantatim* ‖ 'The Buddhists hold that emancipation, which they denote with words such as *nirvāṇa*, is either the cessation of the stream [of cognitions] or the [becoming] pure [of that] stream of cognitions.' See also *Āgamaḍambara* 44,1–5. Schmithausen (2007: 205) mentions two views regarding what happens to *ālayavijñāna* when Arhatship is attained: that it ceases altogether, and that it is preserved but 'emptied of unwholesome seeds'.

[83] I.e., in the terminology of our text, form belongs to cognition not to an object.

[84] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:38. Cf. Tosaki (1985: 10–11).

[85] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:44 = *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:353. Cf. Tosaki (1985: 40–41).

Jayanta now concludes the exposition of Vijñānavāda with a verse of his own composition:

> Someone who in this way (*iti*) sees that (*iti*) this [whole world] is indeed merely consciousness devoid of anything of the nature of an object quits the series of sufferings and attains a fearless *nirvāṇa*.

4 Siddhānta

To this it is replied [as follows].

4.1 There is no non-difference between perceiver and perceived.

4.1.1 Because contradictory properties cannot exist together

As you know (*khalu*),[86] the nature of a cognition,[xx] being single, cannot be both perceiver and perceived by nature, because the natures of the perceiver and the perceived, being mutually dissimilar, cannot cohabit in one and the same locus.

Jayanta turns back on the Buddhist the same argument that the latter used in section 3.7, namely that dissimilar properties must belong to different things.

To explain, being a cognition in nature (*bodharūpatā*), remaining as it does throughout [such a sequence as] 'cognition of blue', 'cognition of yellow', 'cognition of white', despite the arising and ceasing of blue, yellow etc., is determined to be distinct from blue etc. through positive and negative concomitance.[87]

The sense here of *anvaya* (positive concomitance) and *vyatireka* (negative concomitance) differs from the way in which the terms were used in sections 3.4 and 3.5, which was their more usual meaning. As we pass from cognition of blue, to cognition of yellow, there is *anvaya* of the cognition (or, strictly speaking, of the *bodharūpatā*, the fact of being cognition by nature) in the sense that it 'continues' (*anu-i*), but there is *vyatireka* of the yellow, because it 'supercedes' (*vy-ati-ric*), i.e. appears instead of, the blue.[88] Since the cognition-nature continues, but the objects are constantly superceded, cognition and object must be mutually dissimilar and cannot be non-different.

[86] For you have just used this way of arguing in section 3.7.

[87] Cf. *Āgamaḍambara* 80,1–3: *na tu jñānaṃ nīlādyākāram, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tasya gotvādivad bodharūpatvānavadhāraṇād iti.* 'But forms such as blue are not cognition, for they are not determined by positive and negative concomitance to have the nature of cognition in the way that [individual cows *are* established by positive and negative concomitance to have] cowness.'

[88] For this meaning of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, see Staal (1960: 54–55); Staal (1966: 648) and Cardona (1967–68).

4.1.2 Even Buddhists assume the difference of perceiver and perceived.

Furthermore, you accept that cognition is the point of reference for the sense of self, is of the nature of bliss and the like,[89] and is as if active towards its object.[90] An object, on the other hand, does not have such a nature.[91] Therefore how could these two be identical?

4.1.3 Forms appear to us as objects of illumination, not as illuminators.

Even though it is not the case that two forms appear along the lines of 'This is a cognition' and 'This is an object',[92] nevertheless this form, though single, when it appears, appears as an illuminated object and not as an illuminator. In [the cognition] 'this is blue', the form of the perceived object [blue] appears completely separated from [its] perceiver; it is certainly not the case that [it] appears as identical with the [perceiver], i.e. as 'I am blue'.

4.2 The grasping of an object requires a perceiver; but that does not mean that the perceiver is itself grasped.

Moreover, it is indeed correct that the grasping of an illuminated object such as blue depends on an illuminating[xxi] cognition.[93] But it is to be considered by what the cognition grasping that [object] is grasped at that time.

These two sentences contain a distinction crucial to Jayanta's overcoming of the Vijñānavādin's arguments. True, illumination requires an illuminator; if we experience an object, we can be sure that some cognition must have brought that about. But the dependence of the grasping of an object on cognition does not entail that the cognition must be grasped in order for the object to be grasped.

---

[89] For Nyāya it is not in fact cognition (*jñāna*), but rather pleasure (*sukha*), that is of the nature of bliss (see *Nyāyamañjarī* II p. 276,11: *ānandādisvabhāvaṃ prasiddham eva sukhādeḥ*). Pleasure, like cognition, is a quality of the self, but it is not a kind of cognition. For Buddhism, by contrast, pleasure is of the nature of cognition (*jñānātma*).

[90] Cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:37 = *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:308 (the first half of which is cited at *Nyāyamañjarī* I p. 40,12) (cf. Tosaki 1979: 400–401):

> *savyāpāram ivābhāti vyāpāreṇa svakarmaṇi* |
> *tadvaśāt tadvyavasthānād akārakam api svayam* ||

Dharmakīrti is there probably basing himself on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:8cd: *savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṃ phalam eva sat.* Kellner (forthcoming A) translates this as: '[Cognition], though it is actually the result, is [metaphorically referred to as] the means of valid cognition because it is held to perform an activity.'

[91] Objects do not have a sense of self, feel bliss or cognize other objects.

[92] See sections 2.2.1, 3.2.4.2 and 3.4.3.

[93] I.e. 'that much I grant you'. 'But' (this sense is implied by the following sentence) 'you conclude too much from it'. Where did the Buddhist say that the grasping, i.e. illumination, of objects depends on cognition as illuminator? It is an idea that was either implicit or explicit at several places: 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.5.1.

[The grasping of the cognition] is not based on yet another cognition, because that would lead to the undesirable consequence of an infinite regress.

As argued by you yourselves in 3.2.2. In fact Jayanta's own position is that the cognition of the object is, or at least can be, grasped by another cognition. No infinite regress results for him, because he does not hold the view that the cognition must be grasped in order for the object to be grasped. He is thus adopting a Vijñānavādin presupposition here in order to argue against the Vijñānavādin.

Nor is a cognition self-illuminating, because it does not appear in the form 'I am blue'.

As stated at the end of the previous section; rather it appears in the form '*this* is blue'.

Why would it have to be experienced in the form 'I am blue'? Jayanta's argument here seems elliptical. We are dealing at this point with the grasping of the cognition, not the grasping of the object. If the *object* were said to be grasped by itself, then the aptness of the charge that we do not experience 'I am blue' would be easily understood. But it is not obvious why the grasping of cognition by itself should be experienced in the form 'I am blue'.

Some further condition needs to be added, as Cakradhara seems to have been aware, for he points out at this juncture that the Vijñānavādin accepts that the perceiver has forms such as blue and the like.[94] When this consideration is borne in mind, then it follows that the perceiver's grasping of itself should appear in the form 'I am blue'. The pertinent condition that Jayanta has in mind here could equally be the non-difference of object and cognition, since this has been the topic of the previous section (4.1).[95]

Either way it seems clear that just as the other horn of the dilemma, infinite regress, only resulted from a Vijñānavādin presupposition not accepted by the Naiyāyika, the same is true of this horn of the dilemma that we should experience 'I am blue'.

4.2.1 Objection: The appearance of the perceiver just is the appearance of the object.

[Vijñānavādin:] Because (as is stated in 3.5.2) the perceiver and the perceived are not different [from each other],[96] what you accept as the appearance of a perceived object is nothing but the appearance of a perceiver.

---

[94] See *grāhakasyāpi sākāratvābhyupagamāt* (*Granthibhaṅga* 223,7).

[95] That Cakradhara correctly identified the condition that Jayanta had in mind, however, is perhaps suggested by the following sentence in the *Āgamaḍambara* (78,8–12): *sa kiṃ ātmanaḥ prakaṭayaty ākāram anyasya vā? nāhaṃ nīlam iti pratītiḥ, idam ity eṣā tu saṅgacchate vicchedāvagatiḥ paratra*. Dezső (2005) translates: '[D]oes it make manifest its own form, or the form of something else? There is no cognition in the form of "I am blue"; rather, this cognition of the other thing as different, namely "that", agrees with the facts'. Thus, there at least, the point that we do not experience 'I am blue' follows a consideration of form rather than a consideration of non-differenee.

[96] It might seem strange that the Vijñānavādin here simply reasserts the non-difference of perceiver and perceived when this has just been rejected in 4.1. But the assertion of non-difference at the beginning of this section (4.2.1) occurs not as the starting point of a line of argument but rather its endpoint. For in the rest of this section the Vijñānavādin gives the argument that supports the non-difference, namely that if the object were different from cognition it would be insentient by nature. But since both you Naiyāyikas and we Vijñānavādins agree that only one form shines forth

How does this Vijñānavādin objection relate to the preceding Naiyāyika argument? It could be seen to respond to any of the Naiyāyikas points so far.

It is a response to 4.1.1 insofar as it says that perceiver and perceived are not mutually dissimilar. It is a response to 4.1.2 insofar as it challenges the opposition between insentient, inert matter and self-aware, sentient and seemingly active cognition. It is a response to 4.1.3 insofar as it admits that forms appear to us as objects of illumination (*prakāśya*), but denies that that is enough to rule out that they are of the same nature as the subject of illumination (*prakāśaka*).

But it is also intended to respond specifically to the immediately preceding section, 4.2. The Naiyāyika stance there was acceptance of the grasping of an object, but denial of the possibility of grasping the cognition that illuminates that object (*prakāśakagrahaṇa/bodhagrahaṇa*). The Vijñānavādin response here amounts to: grasping of an object just is a grasping of cognition / of the perceiver (see *yo 'yaṃ "grāhyāvabhāsaḥ" iti bhavatābhyupagataḥ, sa eva grāhakāvabhāsaḥ*), for the object is not something insentient, but one aspect of cognition. Therefore, contrary to your assertions in 4.2, cognition is grasped; and it is grasped by the second of the possible means mentioned there, namely self-illumination.

How this is related to the Vijñānavādin's main argument becomes clear in the remainder of this section: if cognition is grasped, it does not lack form; if it has form, what need is there to postulate an external object?

For a perceived object, were it different from a perceiver, would be insentient in nature. A perceiver, on the other hand, is of the nature of an illumination, just because it is a perceiver. And it has already been stated that there are not two appearances.[97] In that case (*tatra*), given that one of the two appears [the question arises as to] which of the two, the insentient entity or the illumination, is the appropriate [candidate] to appear.[xxii] Considering this, obviously it is the illumination that appears and not the insentient entity. And an illumination does not appear without a form.[98] Therefore, given that it appears together with a form, what is the need of an insentient object which is different from that [form-containing illumination]?

The argument is summarized in footnote 96. It resembles, but differs from, the argument that the Vijñānavādin gave in section 3.2.4.

(*prakāśate*), we have to make a choice between the two. Clearly cognition, being of the very nature of illumination (*prakāśa*) is a better candidate (because *prakāśaḥ prakāśate*). Once we thus accept that cognition appears, and therefore has some form, the postulation of an external object, insentient by nature, becomes redundant. Rather that which we perceive (the *grāhya*) is of the nature of cognition, i.e. is not different from the perceiver.

[97] See sections 2.2.1 and 3.4.3.

[98] Why not? Perhaps the idea is that if it lacked form it would be completely transparent and we would see right through it. This step in the argument does not seem strictly necessary, for the appearance/form is already there; we are just considering whether it is of the nature of an insentient entity or of *prakāśa*. Thus Jayanta may not have intended this as a general point excluding the possibility that *prakāśa* can ever appear without form; he may have intended by it just that in this particular case *prakāśa* is clearly appearing with the form because an insentient entity is not. In which case it would be better to translate as 'And the illumination does not appear without a form'.

The argument in 3.2.4 started from the consideration that cognition must be grasped before an object can be grasped (since this had been established in the three previous sections). Since it is grasped, it must have some form. Since only one form appears to us, we must only experience cognition. Therefore an external object becomes redundant.

This argument starts from the consideration that only one form appears. Thus in deciding to what that form belongs we have to choose one out of the two candidates: an insentient object or illuminating cognition. Since an illumination is obviously something that appears (because *prakāśaḥ prakāśate*), we are compelled to choose that. Therefore an insentient, external object is redundant.

4.2.2 Reply: Cognition, like the eye, is a means; means do not make the target redundant.

[Naiyāyika:] This is not clever, for one cannot deny a target through the means [of reaching it]. To explain (*hi*), an eye is [the means] which illuminates a colour [as its target]; [and] one cannot deny a colour saying that an eye alone should appear. This cognition is [the means] which illuminates an object whose nature is specified by properties such as materiality, fluidity, hardness and the like, [whereas the cognition is] transparent in nature in stark contrast to those [properties]. [Therefore] it is no more the case that [cognition] (*tat*) itself could appear in that way, than it is that an eye [could appear as colour].

We should not sacrifice the target for the sake of the means. The very point of using means is to reach a target. Nor *could* we do away with a target such as a coloured object by assuming that it is merely a manifestation of one of its means. Cognition, having a nature quite contrary to that of the object, is no better candidate for appearing as the coloured object than the eye is.

4.2.3 Objection: Eye and cognition are disanalogous.

[Vijñānavādin:] Cognition [though a means] is not a means in the same way that the eye [is a means], because [unlike the eye] it is of the nature of an illumination.[99] For what we term cognition is the so-called illumination that is *produced* by the eye. And an illumination that is not grasped does not illuminate an object of illumination.

In 4.2.1 the Vijñānavādin, by stressing that cognition is of the nature of an illumination (*prakāśasvabhāva*), i.e. that it resembles light, was able to reach the conclusion that cognition alone appears, not an object. Thus Jayanta's rebuttal of this in 4.2.2 stressed the kinship of cognition not to light, but to an eye. These two examples, light and an eye, are suitable for rendering plausible the conclusions of, re-

---

[99] It is true that the Sanskrit here could just mean 'Cognition is not a means, unlike the eye [which is a means]'. The following sentence would also be consistent with such an interpretation: cognition, rather than *being* a means, is *produced* by a means, namely the eye.

But 1) the Vijñānavādin's argument at this stage only requires that cognition is not akin to the eyes, and that point can be made without having to deny that cognition is a means; and 2) for the Vijñānavādin cognition *is* a means. See the following argument attributed to him at the beginning of section 4.3: *upāyatvāj jñānasya pūrvaṃ grahaṇam*.

Thus we prefer to interpret this sentence as meaning that although cognition is a means, it is unlike the eye in that it is an illumination by nature.

spectively, the Vijñānavādin and the Naiyāyika. It is as though two different inferences are in the background of the text in these sections: 1) Cognition is perceived, because like a light it is an illumination by nature; 2) Cognition is not perceived, because like an eye it is a means of bringing about perception.

Thus we can see why here in 4.2.3 the Vijñānavādin wants to assert that the eye is not a good analogy for cognition. He disassociates the two in two ways: 1) cognition is of the nature of an illumination and the eye is not; 2) far from them both being means on the same level, cognition is actually produced by the eye.

With his final point that an illumination that is not grasped cannot illuminate anything, he implies the following specific disanalogy: while an eye, not being an illumination by nature, enables us to grasp objects without itself being grasped, cognition, being an illumination by nature, enables us to grasp objects only when it is itself grasped.

4.2.4 Reply: An illumination is an illumination of an object, not of an illumination.

[Naiyāyika:] True, what we term cognition is an illumination produced by the eye. But that illumination is an illumination of an object such as a colour, not an illumination of an illumination.[100] For what is illuminated by an eye is not an illumination, but rather a colour.

If, as you Vijñānavādin just said, illumination is produced by the eye, it should be an illumination of what the eye is capable of illuminating, namely a colour, not an illumination.

In [the sentence 'colour is illuminated by the eye'] what is expressed by 'colour' is an object to be grasped. [The action] that is expressed by 'is illuminated',[xxiii] on the other hand, is illumination, [more specifically] grasping cognition.

Why does Jayanta include this? How does this contention differentiate his position from the Buddhist position? The point is that, for him, illumination is the grasper (*grāhaka*) and an object such as colour is the grasped (*grāhya*); whereas for the Vijñānavādin illumination/cognition is both the grasper and the grasped.

And the colour becomes illuminated by a mere arising of the [cognition]. Therefore an illumination does not require to be grasped.

The eye produces a cognition. By the mere arising of that cognition, colour is illuminated. The very nature of the cognition consists in illuminating the colour; it does not require anything further such as a grasping of itself. Thus the Vijñānavādin's contention in the previous section (4.2.3) that an illumination must be grasped in order to grasp an object is false.

---

[100] Cf. *Āgamaḍambara* 78,21–22: *prakāśyaprakāśo hy asau prakāśaḥ, na prakāśaprakāśa eva.*

4.2.5 Objection: To see an object, cognition itself must be grasped.

[Vijñānavādin:] But as has already been stated (by us in 3.2.2):[101]

When a cognition is not perceived, an object does not appear in it (*atra*).

Seeing an object cannot be accomplished for someone whose cognition [of the object] is imperceptible.

4.2.6 Reply: The seeing of an object is the mere arising of cognition, not the grasping of cognition.

[Naiyāyika:] That is incorrect. Seeing an object, on the contrary, can be accomplished *only* for someone whose cognition [of the object] is imperceptible. The seeing of an object is just the occurrence of a cognition,[xxiv] not the seeing of the cognition.

4.2.7 Objection: Then the presence or absence of the cognition would make no difference.

[Vijñānavādin:] Surely if the cognition is not grasped, there would be no difference between its occurrence or non-occurrence. Hence an object would be perceptible even for someone whose cognition [of the object] does not occur. So it would undesirably follow that everyone would be omniscient.

4.2.8 Reply: It makes a difference because the seeing of an object just is the occurrence of a cognition.

[Naiyāyika:] That is wonderfully expressed! As you know, cognition by its very nature is the illumination of an object. How could that, when non-occurrent, not be distinguished from when it is occurrent?

For when it is not occurrent there is no illumination of an object; so that is very easily distinguishable from when it is occurrent, when, by definition, there is an illumination of an object.

Therefore because a cognition has as its nature the making perceptible of an object, the object's being perceptible is nothing more than the occurrence of the [cognition],[xxv] not the grasping of that [cognition]. So it is correct that cognition, *unperceived*, illuminates an object.

[101] In fact only the second half of this verse, which is *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:54cd, was stated earlier. The first half has been composed by Jayanta and added here as an accompaniment to Dharmakīrti's half-verse.

4.3 The instrumentality of cognition

As for [your] claim—because it is a means, cognition is grasped first[102]—that is inconclusive because of such [means] as the eye, as we have said.

This continues the refutation of the position that cognition needs to be perceived, but focuses on the specific argument that cognition, because it is a means, must be perceived prior to the object. Where has this particular argument been stated? The closest thing to it that the Vijñānavādin has said is his claim at the beginning of section 3.2: *jñānaṃ hi prakāśakam aprakāśasyārthasya bhavadbhir abhyupagamyate, tataś cārthāt prathamataram asya grahaṇena bhavitavyam.* This seems to be the only candidate for what Jayanta is referring back to here with *yat ... ucyate.* But two difficulties need to be noted. 1) The gist there is not precisely *upāyatvāj jñānasya pūrvaṃ grahaṇam*, but rather *prakāśakatvāj jñānasya pūrvaṃ grahaṇam.* 2) The next section (4.4) is clearly a refutation of the beginning of 3.2, referring to it at its outset: *yad api prakāśatvāj jñānasya pradīpavat pūrvaṃ grahaṇam uktam, tad api vyākhyeyam.* If the beginning of 3.2 is clearly what is refuted in the next section, is it likely also to be what is refuted in this section?

We do not have a completely satisfactory solution to this problem, but it is noteworthy that Kumārila too gives two separate refutations in his *siddhānta*, directed towards arguments from *upāyatva* and *prakāśakatva.* Is it possible that Jayanta is simply following Kumārila's *siddhānta* and forgetting that he did not mention an argument from *upāyatva* in his own *pūrvapakṣa* section? In fact Kumārila also does not clearly present two separate arguments in his *pūrvapakṣa* section, but when stating the argument from *prakāśakatva,* he clarifies *prakāśakam* with *upāyasaṃmatam.* So the idea of cognition being a means is present in the source of Jayanta's *pūrvapakṣa* presentation of the *prakāśakatva* argument. He did not reflect that in his own *pūrvapakṣa* presentation, but he refers to it here in his *siddhānta.*

There may be some significance in the fact that Jayanta uses *ucyate* here to refer to the *upāyatva* argument, but *uktam* in the next section to refer to the *prakāśakatva* argument: with *uktam* he refers to the argument that was actually stated; with *ucyate* he refers to the similar but distinguishable argument that could be implied—that implication having been made somewhat explicit in the source for his presentation, though not in his own.

Jayanta responds here to the argument by pointing out that, as he has already stated, it is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because the eyes and the other sense-faculties are means but are not perceived. He must be referring back to 4.2.2–4, for that is the only place where he has mentioned the eyes. He did not actually use the word 'inconclusive' (*anaikāntika*) there, nor did he refer to an argument based on the logical reason 'because it is a means', but the inconclusiveness of such an argument was implied to the extent that his reasoning there (in 4.2.2) rested on the eyes not being perceptible.

> And if [you maintain that] a cognition, [only] when grasped, can bring about the illumination of an object, then you need to state [as a corroborating example of a means that, only when grasped, can bring about the illumination of objects] 'like smoke [in bringing about inferential knowledge of fire]' or 'like a lamp [in bringing about perception of colour]'. If [you opt for] 'like smoke', then the object would be something inferred. And you yourselves criticized this [view that objects can be inferred].[xxvi]

---

[102] I.e. prior to the object being grasped.

In your refutation of the Sautrāntikas in section 3.4. The Vijñānavādin there argued against the view that external objects could be inferred from forms within cognition. But the Vijñānavādin would be committing himself to just such a view if he were to claim here that cognition, like smoke, by being directly perceived, allows one to infer the existence of an object that is other than it and that one does not directly perceive.

> Nor is [a cognition] 'like a lamp', because there is no awareness of two forms. [To explain: in the case of a lamp] there is an awareness of both [pot and lamp] in such a way as 'I am looking at a pot by means of a lamp'. But it is not the case that we grasp both [a cognition and its object] in such a way as 'I am perceiving a cognized object by means of a cognition.

We would not describe our experience in that way, because we experience just the object, not also some separate means of illuminating it, namely cognition. This is not analogous to the case of a lamp, for there we can experience the lamp as something separate from the object that it illuminates.

4.4 Cognition's ability to illuminate

4.4.1 Interpretations of 'because it is an illumination'

As to what [you] claimed (in section 3.2.1)—that a cognition is grasped first because it is an illumination (*prakāśatvāt*) like a lamp—that also needs to be scrutinized: what is the [precise] meaning of 'because it is an illumination' (*prakāśatvāt*)?

4.4.1.1 Causal: because it makes manifest

[Vijñānavādin:] An illumination (*prakāśaḥ*) is what makes [something] manifest (*prakāśayati*). Its nature (*bhāva*) is 'being an illumination' (*prakāśatvam*).

[Naiyāyika:] [If that is the case, then] this [being an illumination], as has already been stated (in 4.2.2 and 4.3), is inconclusive because of eyes and such like.

The eyes and the other sense-faculties make things manifest, yet they are not grasped at all, let alone first. So they make the logical reason 'because it is an illumination' understood as 'because it makes things manifest' inconclusive as a reason for the property to be proved, 'being grasped first'.

4.4.1.2 Intransitive: being manifest

If an illumination (*prakāśaḥ*) is the process of being manifest (*prakāśanam*), then 'because it is an illumination' is an unestablished logical reason.[103] For a cognition is not manifest at the time when it grasps an object.

At that time only the object appears, according to the Naiyāyikas, not cognition also.

[103] Unestablished in the proof-subject (*pakṣa*), namely cognition.

4.4.1.3 Synonym: being a cognition

If the word 'illumination' is merely a synonym of 'cognition', in other words if 'because it is an illumination' means 'because it is a cognition in nature', then the example ['a lamp'] lacks the reason ['being a cognition in nature']. For a lamp is not a cognition in nature.

A logical reason (*hetu*) must be pervaded by the property to be proved (*sādhya*), must be present in the proof-subject (*pakṣa*), and must be present in the example. The first of these conditions is not met if *prakāśatvāt* means 'because it makes manifest'; the second is not met if it means 'because it is manifest'; the third is not met if it means 'because it is cognition in nature'.

4.4.2 There is nothing self-illuminating.

For the following reason too, the self-awareness doctrine is inappropriate: because we do not find anything at all that is self-illuminating.

4.4.2.1 Objection: Three self-illuminating entities

[Vijñānavādin:] [Bhartṛhari] says that three illuminations, i.e. cognition, speech, and lamps, illuminate [both] themselves and other things.[104]

4.4.2.2 Reply: The three require external factors.

[Naiyāyika:] This is not right, because speech and lamps depend on external causal complexes in order to be grasped themselves and in order to illuminate objects. Speech depends on the learning of linguistic convention in order to illuminate an object, and on an ear in order to illuminate itself.[xxvii]

Unless I know the language that is being spoken, its conventional connections between words and their meanings, speech will appear to me as just so much sound, without giving rise in me to cognitions of the objects it is talking about. And if I am deaf, then whether I know the language that is being spoken or not, speech will not even provoke in me cognitions of sound.

A lamp, too, only in dependence upon an eye and the like, is grasped and enables an object to be grasped. But there is this much difference: in grasping a pot and the like, an eye operates in dependence on light; but in grasping light it [operates] without depending [on light]. [But it does not follow] from this much [difference that] a lamp is self-

---

[104] Cf. *Āgamaḍambara* 78,23–24: *tad uktam, 'trayaḥ prakāśāḥ svaparaprakāśāḥ' iti.*

Both that and our sentence seem to be inexact quotations of *Vākyapadīyasvavṛtti* ad 1:12 (p. 43,1–4): *iha trīṇi jyotīṃṣi trayaḥ prakāśāḥ svarūpapararūpayor avadyotakāḥ. tad yathā, yo 'yaṃ jātavedā yaś ca puruṣeṣv āntaraḥ prakāśo yaś ca prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyaḥ prakāśaḥ.* 'In this world there are three lights, three illuminations that reveal both their own form and the forms of things other than themselves, namely: fire, the illumination within people (i.e. cognition), and speech, [the last of these being] the illumination that illuminates both [the three] illuminations and non-illuminations.'

illuminating.[105] And if it did, then absolutely all pots and other [visible objects] would be self-illuminating from the viewpoint of the eyes of nocturnal creatures such as cats.

The plausibility of the idea that light is self-illuminating derives from a distinction between light and external objects. This distinction is characterized by those who want to use light as an example of something self-illuminating as that when we perceive light, it illuminates itself, but when we perceive an object, it requires illumination by something other than itself. But the distinction can be more accurately characterized as that our perception of light does not depend on light, whereas our perception of objects does depend on light. That a thing's non-dependence on light for being perceived is not equivalent to it being self-revealing is made clear from the fact that cats and the like can perceive even pots and such like without light.

Note that this argument is more sophisticated than the simple point that light is perceived not by itself but by something other than itself. Of course the only thing even potentially capable of revealing itself *to itself* is eognition, and that is the proof-subject so it cannot serve as an example. To dismiss the example of light merely on the grounds that it is perceived by something other than itself, as though it fell into exaetly the same camp as pots, would be to neglect an important difference between the two. Jayanta's argument takes the example more seriously than that; it identifies the features of light that make it look like a plausible instance of something self-revealing, and then re-explains them.

There is a sense in which, unlike pots that are incapable of revealing themselves to human eyes, light *is* capable of revealing itself to human eyes. But even that revealing of itself *to others* is dependent on other factors. So even if we do not get hung up on the fact that light does not reveal itself to itself, and allow that it does have a significant feature, its ability to reveal itself to others, nevertheless it is not even capable of bringing about *that* feature *itself,* because it depends on other factors.

As for cognition, on the other hand, it is seen to have the property of illuminating other things alone, not the property of illuminating itself, because it has been explained (in 4.4.1.2) that it [itself] is not manifest at the time when it illuminates an object.

Having dealt with speech and lamps, he comes now to the third of the trio, eognition, the principal topic of dispute. The standard example used by the Vijñānavādin to render cognition's self-luminosity plausible, namely light/lamps has been shown after all not to be self-illuminating; and neither could speech take its place as a corroborating example. But it is at least possible that cognition is the one and only thing in the universe that is self-illuminating; lack of other examples is not itself decisive. Thus he gives here an independent reason for cognition not being self-illuminating.

In his analysis of speech and lamps Jayanta mentioned their self-grasping/self-illumination (*svagrahaṇa, svaprakāśana).* But here he denies that an equivalent thing can happen to cognition. The case of cognition thus turns out to come even less close than light and speech to being truly self-illuminating; at least they are capable of revealing themselves to others (even if they depend on other factors to do so).

---

[105] Here, Jayanta denies that a lamp is *svaprakāśa* and in the first and last sentence of this section (4.4.2) denies that anything at all is *svaprakāśa.* Nevertheless he spoke above of speech's *svaprakāśana,* contrasting that with its *arthaprakāśana.* The apparent contradiction can be removed in two ways: 1) we can interpret *svaprakāśana* when he does not deny it as 'revealing of itself [to others]', and when he does deny it as 'revealing of itself [to itself]'. 2) His talk of speech's *svaprakāśana* was a preliminary characterization, but on further analysis even speech's supposed 'revealing of itself' to others turns out to depend on other factors, so is not carried out by itself alone, so is not truly *svaprakāśa.*

Cognition is capable neither of revealing itself to others, nor of revealing itself to itself. All it is capable of is revealing other things (*paraprakāśatvam*).

4.4.2.3 Conclusion

> Therefore it is stated quite falsely that these three illuminations named lamp, cognition and speech are capable of illuminating both themselves and things other than themselves—they [in fact] reveal [other things] and are [themselves] revealed (*abhivedya*) through external causal complexes.[xxviii]

4.4.3 Perception of the self is not a case of self-illumination.

For the [Mīmāṃsaka] adherents [of the view] that a self is perceptible, on the other hand, there certainly exists a distinction between the part of it that is the perceiver and the part of it that is perceived, in accordance with the difference of its states. Therefore cognition is in no way self-illuminating.

The text is slightly elliptical. The context in the *Ślokavārttika* source of Jayanta's remark here is as follows. Kumārila has been arguing against the possibility of cognition being self-illuminating, partly on the grounds that one thing cannot be both perceiver and perceived. The Vijñānavādin objects that surely for Kumārila one thing is both perceiver and perceived, namely the self; how else could Kumārila explain his position that the self is perceptible? Kumārila appeals to his view that the self, though one, is plural to the extent that it has a plurality of states. Its substance-nature is different from its cognition, one of its properties. When the self perceives itself it is not a case of self-illumination, because one aspect of it, namely its cognition, is the perceiver, and a *different* aspect of itself, namely its substance-nature, is the perceived.[106]

Jayanta thus imagines that his Vijñānavādin opponent may likewise point out that even Jayanta's fellow Brahmins, the Mīmāṃsakas, accept that one thing, the self, is self-illuminating, and if the self, why not also cognition? Jayanta points out, following Kumārila, that in the case of perception of the self it is not one thing perceiving itself, but one aspect (*aṃśa*) or state (*avasthā*) of the self perceiving another aspect or state of the self. There is thus difference, not non-difference, between perceiver and perceived.

Jayanta's phrase 'adherents of the view that a self is perceptible' could refer also to those of Jayanta's fellow Naiyāyikas who hold the self to be perceptible, but it is likely to refer primarily to the Kaumārila Mīmāṃsakas, because a difference of perceiver and perceived within the self based on a difference of its states is a specifically Kaumārilan view.

---

[106] *Śūnyavāda* 67cd–68:

nanv ātmā grāhako grāhyo bhavatābhyupagamyate ||
kathaṃcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnatvāt pratyayasya tat |
grāhakatvaṃ bhavet tatra, grāhyaṃ dravyādi cātmanaḥ ||

[Vijñānavādin:] Surely *you* hold that the self is both perceiver and perceived.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] The nature of being a perceiver (*tat grāhakatvam*) with regard to the [self] (*tatra*) can belong to cognition (*pratyayasya*), because [cognition], as a property (*dharma*), is somehow different [from its locus]; what is perceived is the self's [nature as] substance etc.

4.5 Refutation of: 'cognition is grasped as soon as it arises, because it does not depend on any further illumination, and because there can be no obstruction'

4.5.1 A causal complex is required for cognizing a cognition.

And as for what you claimed (in 3.2.2)—

> A cognition, merely by arising, is grasped at that very instant, because it does not depend on [some other illumination][107] and because there could be nothing that obstructs [its being grasped];[108] otherwise (i.e. if it were not grasped at that very instant), it could never [be grasped][109]—

that too is not right. For in the moment [when a cognition arises] there is no causal complex [that enables one] to grasp it.

A cognition can potentially be grasped subsequently through *anuvyavasāya* (a perceptual determining of a preceding cognition), according to the Naiyāyika, but the causes that enable *anuvyavasāya*, such as a certain quality of attention and a certain connection between the self and the internal organ, are not present at the moment when the cognition arises.

> And it is not the case that a cognition is apprehended owing to the mere absence of obstruction. [For] as a result of the absence of the means [of its being grasped] also,[110] a cognition is not grasped at that time.

The absence of an obstruction *is* necessary, but it is not enough; we also need the presence of something, namely the means through which cognition is grasped.

4.5.2 The difference between Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya concerning the way in which a cognition is grasped

And unlike the followers of Jaimini, we do not insist that a cognition is never perceptible. For one can experience the grasping of an object *qualified by a [cognition]* after [that cognition] in the form 'this object was *cognized* by me.'

> Just as in the cognition 'the cloth is white', the [cloth] (*asau*) appears as qualified by that [colour white], so in the cognition 'the object has been cognized', the object appears as qualified by a cognition.

---

[107] See in 3.2.2 *na ca prakāśāntarāpekṣaṇam.*

[108] See in 3.2.2 *jñānasya tūtpannasya sato na kaścid grahaṇe pratibandhakaḥ.*

[109] See in 3.2.2 *yadaiva tasyotpādaḥ, tadaiva grahaṇam avaśyaṃ bhavet. na cet, kālāntare 'pi na syāt.*

[110] The sense of the 'also' is: as a result of the absence of the means *in addition to* as a result of an obstruction.

> And there is no awareness of a qualified thing whose qualifier has not been grasped. [Therefore cognition must have been grasped.]

Up to this point he has shown, through a kind of inference, that we must have grasped cognition. Now he responds to an imagined objection from a Mīmāṃsaka opponent who accepts that we must indeed have grasped cognition, but holds that that grasping is inferential, not perceptual.

> Nor is it the case that one experiences the cognition which determines [a preceding cognition][111] in the way above mentioned (*ittham*).

I.e. as consisting of an inferential process.

> [Rather one determines the earlier cognition directly without an inferential process.] For one does not grasp the [inferential] process (*kramāgrahāt*).

The elliptical last half-verse would have been extremely difficult to construe were it not for Kataoka (2006: 83, note 60) having spotted the following parallel argument (with regard to the perceptibility of the self as opposed to the perceptibility of cognition):[112]

> The author of the Bhāṣya (i.e. Vātsyayana) has himself shown that there is indeed a grasping of an object qualified by the *cognizer's* cognition [in such cases as 'the object was grasped by *me*'], and how could it be appropriate to disregard that?
>
> It is held that there is no cognition of something qualified whose qualifier has not been grasped. Neither is a memory of something that has not been experienced earlier possible.
>
> And we do not have a cognition of an object qualified by the [self] after first knowing the self through inference as the qualifier, because we do not determine such an [inferential] sequence.
>
> Therefore the self is directly perceived.

Just as 'the object was *cognized*' indicates that cognition must have been grasped earlier through *anuvyavasāya*/*anusāyadhi*; so 'the object was cognized by *me*' indicates that the self must have been grasped earlier through *mānasapratyakṣa*.

Could the earlier grasping of cognition and self not be inferential? No, because we have no consciousness of any such inferential process, and we would have if an inference had been carried out.

---

[111] *anusāyadhī* is used here as a synonym of *anuvyavasāya*.

[112] *Nyāyamañjarī* II p. 277,2–8:

> *jñātṛjñānaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ kila bhāṣyakṛt* |
> *svayaṃ prādīdṛśat tac ca kiṃ vā yuktam upekṣitum* ||
> *viśeṣyabuddhim icchanti nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇām* |
> *pūrvaṃ cānanubhūtasya smaraṇaṃ nāvakalpate* ||
> *na cānumānataḥ pūrvaṃ jñātvātmānaṃ viśeṣaṇam* |
> *tadviśiṣṭārthabuddhiḥ syāt kramasyānavadhāraṇāt* ||

tasmāt pratyakṣa ātmā.

And a cognition which is always imperceptible cannot even be inferred; I have already elaborated that too.[113] Enough of this talk! Why at present do we [have to] attack a Brahmin [colleague], letting a Buddhist off the hook?

4.6 Response to the argument from reflection on an earlier cognition (*avamarśa*)

And it is for that reason (*ataḥ*)[114] that your claim (in 3.2.3)—

> Grasping an object must be preceded by grasping the cognition [itself], because we find that [subsequently] we reflect (*avamarśa*) [on that object] as subsequent to cognition—

does not hold in every case. Rather it is admitted (*tathābhyupagamyate*) only in some cases, because [in such cases] we have an awareness of an object qualified by a cognition.

The Vijñānavādin's argument maintained that since reflections on objects as having been cognized involve a memory not only of the object, but also of the cognition, the cognition must have been grasped

---

[113] *Nyāyamañjarī* I p. 53,6–7: *yadi ca nityaparokṣo jñātṛvyāpāraḥ, sa tarhi pratibandhāgrahaṇād anumātum api na śakyaḥ.* 'And if the action of the cognizer (i.e. cognition) were always imperceptible, then it could not even be inferred, because no logical connection could be grasped.'

[114] All other instances of *ataś ca* in this passage point forward ('And for the following reason'), not back. But here it is unlikely to be pointing forward because there is nothing for it to point forward to, and there are things it could point back to.

Whereas the other instances of *ataś ca*, which point forward, are followed either by an ablative or a *hi*, here it is followed by a statement: *api tu ... abhyupagamyate* (which is itself supported by an ablative). Then that it is the end of the section: there is nothing after that to which it could point. The ablative that supports *abhyupagamyate* (*jñānaviśiṣṭārthasaṃvedanāt*) is unlikely to be the target of a phrase meaning 'And for the following reason', not only beeause it is giving a reason for something else, but also because it does not make a new point; the point it makes has just been explained at length in the previous section: see *tadviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇadarśanāt* and the following three half-verses.

We take it that *ataś ca* here points back to the argument of the previous section (4.5) that cognition is not always grasped since the means for it being grasped are not always there (4.5.1), but that it can be grasped as evidenced by our ability to have a cognition of an object qualified by a cognition (4.5.2). Therefore the argument that the grasping of an object depends on the grasping of the cognition does not hold in every case (*na sārvatrikam*), but rather only occasionally (*kvacid eva*).

The reason that Jayanta decided to insert section 4.5.2, which is parenthetical in that it digresses from his Vijñānavāda-refutation, thus seems to be not only because of its connection with 4.5.1, but also because of its prefiguring of this section 4.6. The refutation of the *avamarśa* argument, i.e. the topic of this section 4.6, starts to emerge in 4.5.2 insofar as we get there i) a discussion of *jñāto mayāyam arthaḥ* (which is how Jayanta articulates the *avamarśa* in the *pūrvapakṣa*), ii) the maxim about qualifier and qualified, which was used to support the *avamarśa* argument in the *pūrvapakṣa*, and iii) a mention of *jñānaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇa*, which is the way in which Jayanta characterizes *avamarśa* in 4.6.

earlier. Jayanta does not spell out how precisely he is rejecting that argument here. We understand his assertion that the argument holds only in some cases as follows.

Cognition of an object must be preceded by cognition of the cognition not always, but only in those cases such as reflections (*avamarśa*) that involve grasping an object as having been cognized, i.e. as qualified by an earlier cognition. These do indeed presuppose an earlier grasping of the cognition, but standard cognitions of objects do not. The grasping of cognition presupposed in the first case, furthermore, takes the form of *anuvyavasāya*, something that takes place after, not before and not simultaneous with, the original cognition of the object.

Having now refuted all of the arguments for cognition being grasped before it grasps an object, Jayanta concludes:

Therefore [your argument in 3.2.4]—

> Because a cognition appears before grasping an object, and because there is no determining of it as devoid of form, this form belongs to cognition alone[115]—

is mere chat out of vain hope by the red-cloth-wearing [Buddhists].

4.7 Response to the claim of less postulation

Now you said (in 3.1) that there is less postulation if we accept the view that it is cognition that has form.

4.7.1 An external object is not postulated but directly perceived.

Regarding this (*tatra*),[xxix] given that in the above-mentioned manner[116] the form of an object is apprehended by direct perception as something external to be grasped, how can [you] say it is postulated? Or in what way is the [postulation] less or more?

It makes no sense to say that an external object is postulated, since it is seen; so it makes no sense to say that accepting an external object involves more, or even less, *postulation*.

4.7.2 Response to the claim that cognition is established for both of us

And with regard to what [you] said of cognition (in 3.1.3), namely that it is established for both [parties in this debate]: if the reckoning of an entity is dependent upon means of valid cognition, an object too is certainly established for both. But if, on the other hand, the reckoning of an entity is dependent upon desire or aversion, how can a cognition, for its part, be established for both? Therefore this [point of yours] amounts to nothing.

If the Buddhist is free to assert the non-establishment of external objects simply on the basis of his own aversion, then Jayanta is free to do the same with regard to cognition.

---

[115] See in 3.2.3–4: *tasmād api pūrvaṃ jñānagrahaṇam iti siddham. jñānaṃ ca grāhyamāṇaṃ ākārarahitaṃ grahītum aśakyam iti balāt sākāram eva tad grahītavyam.*

[116] It is not obvious what he is referring to; most likely one or more of the following: 2.1, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.6, 4.2.8.

4.8 Response to the argument that cognition's object-specificity implies that it has form

4.8.1 The object-specificity can be explained through causal link.

Now as for this claim that you made (in 3.3.1)—

> Even if one accepts an external object, one cannot deny that a cognition is united with a form, [for that is the only way] to establish the object-specificity of cognition [such that sometimes it is of blue, for example, and at other times of yellow][117]—

this too is not right, because [cognition's] object-specificity is also explicable in another way. Although a cognition of blue does arise in the presence of many things, and although its being a cognition in nature does not vary with regard to all [objects],[118] nevertheless it is produced only by blue alone as its object causal factor (*karmakāraka*), and therefore it stands as oriented towards blue alone.

For the Vijñānavādin the only thing capable of explaining that a cognition is of blue and not of yellow is that it has blue as its form. The Naiyāyika here provides an alternative explanation, namely that because blue is the object causal factor (*karmakāraka*) that produces the cognition, it arises with blue as its object, despite not having blue as its form. Whereas the Vijñānavādin's explanation of the object-specificity of cognition is *tadākāratā* (its having that object as its form), the Naiyāyika's is *tajjanyatvam* (its being produced by that object).

[Vijñānavādin:] [As I said in 3.3.2][119] it is produced also by eyes [and light] etc. [and therefore it should have them as objects too].

[Naiyāyika:] It is true that it is produced [by eyes etc.], but not by [them] as an object.[120] It is produced by blue *as an object*, on the other hand. Therefore it has nothing other than that alone as its content.

---

[117] See in 3.3.1 *kalpayitvāpi bāhyam artham avaśyam ākāravattā vijñānasya viṣayaniyamasiddhaye vaktavyā.*

[118] These were the two facts adduced by the Vijñānavādin to support his argument. See in 3.3.1: *nīlajñānaṃ hīdam anekasannidhāne samupajāyamānaṃ katham akhilataditarapadārthaparihāreṇa kevalanīlānulagnatām avalambeta, bodhasvabhāvatāyāḥ sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt.*

Our construal of *bodharūpatvam aśeṣasādhāraṇam* derives from taking it to be parallel to *bodhasvabhāvatāyāḥ sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt.*

[119] See *na ca nīlajanitatvakṛta eṣa tadadhigatiniyama iti kathayitum ucitam, ālokalocanādikārakāntarajanitatvasyāpi bhāve tadviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt.*

[120] Many factors go into the production of the cognition 'this is blue', but all except blue belong to some category of causal factor other than object (*karma*). The eyes and light are means.

4.8.2 The restriction is based on the nature of things.

[Vijñānavādin:] On what is this restriction [that a cognition has as its object only its object causal factor] based?

[Naiyāyikas:] It is just caused by the nature of things.

This same question applies equally to the view that [cognition has] form. In response to the question of why blue alone is the object causal factor or why a cognition has as its content only the object [and not any of the other causal factors], one has [no other way but] to reply by [resorting to] 'the nature of things'. And equally in response to the question of how it is that a cognition, in receiving a *form*, should receive [the form] only of the object causal factor and not of other causal factors, one could resort only to 'the nature of things'.

4.8.3 Proof that cognition is caused by an object

And it is known through positive and negative concomitance that an object causes a cognition.

When an object is there, there is a cognition. When an object is not there, there is no cognition.

> To explain (*hi*): Someone wishing to see Devadatta visits his house. And despite having gone there, he does not see him [if] Devadatta (*enam*) is not there.[121]
>
> When Devadatta comes back later, he does see him.[122] When [such a sequence as this occurs],[xxx] one sees in it that cognition of Devadatta (*taddhiyaḥ*) accords with his presence or absence.[xxxi]

As long as Devadatta had not come back, cognition of Devadatta was not caused to arise. When he came back, it arose. Thus the [cognition] is determined to be produced by him on the grounds that it exists when he exists. This being the case, [cognition's] being restricted to [that object alone][xxxii] is established by its being produced by that [object]. So enough of postulating a form [of cognition]!

This [restriction of cognition to a particular object as a result of being produced by it][xxxiii] explains [why] human activity too has a particular object.[123]

---

[121] Negative concomitance.

[122] Positive concomitance.

[123] This was an additional point that the Vijñānavādin claimed to be impossible unless cognition had form; see *pravṛttir api prekṣāpūrvakāriṇāṃ kathaṃ tadekaviṣayaiva syāt* (3.3.1).

4.8.4 The whole causal complex is the most effective factor.

As for the character of being the most effective factor, it has already been demonstrated, in [the chapter on] the definition of *pramāṇa* in general,[124] that it belongs to the causal complex as a whole [and not to just one of the various causal factors].

In the section (3.3.4) of the *pūrvapakṣa* to which this section responds, the Vijñānavādin claimed that if cognition did not have form, none of the causal factors (*kārakas*) would have preeminence over the others, so none of them would be the most effective one. Here he replies that indeed no individual causal factor is the most effective one; as he has already shown in the first *āhnika* of the text, the most effective factor, i.e. the *pramāṇa*, is the whole causal complex, i.e. the totality of all the causal factors. After all, if any one of the causal factors, whether agent, object, locus or other, were taken away, then the result would not be produced. Therefore one, or some, cannot be isolated from the others as the most effective.

4.8.5 Conventional Expressions

As for everyday linguistic usage, which [you] adduced (in 3.3.5),[125] it too deviates.[126] It is not the case that people never[xxxiv] also say as follows: 'This is a blue object, because a cognition with that [blue thing] as its object has arisen'.

The Vijñānavādin adduces expressions like 'a cognition having that as its form (*tadākāram*) has arisen'; the Naiyāyika adduces expressions like 'a cognition having that as its object (*tadviṣayam*) has arisen'. What is the significant difference? The latter implies the existence of something outside of itself.

Therefore the assertion that a form-possessing cognition must be accepted even if an [external] object exists is not appropriate.[127]

4.9 Response to the necessary co-perception argument

4.9.1 If two things are actually one, how can they be 'together'?

And as for what [you] said (in 3.5.2)—

---

[124] *Nyāyamañjarī* I p. 32,13–15: *yata eva sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam, karaṇasādhanaś ca pramāṇaśabdaḥ, tata eva sāmagryāḥ pramāṇatvaṃ yuktam, tadvyatirekeṇa kārakāntare kvacid api tamabarthasaṃsparśānupapatteḥ.* 'Precisely because the word *pramāṇa* denotes the instrument, and the instrument is the most effective thing [in the bringing about of any action], [it follows that] it is appropriate for the whole causal complex to be the *pramāṇa*, because it is not possible that any [individual] causal factor whatsoever apart from the [whole causal complex] have contact with the meaning "most" [effective].'

[125] In section 3.3.5 the Vijñānavādin adduced as evidence for cognition having form such everyday expressions as 'This is a blue object because in my mind a cognition with that form has arisen'.

[126] I.e. it may sometimes support you, but it sometimes supports us.

[127] Section 3.3 both began and ended with the contention that even if an external object existed, one would still have to postulate a form belonging to cognition, for otherwise the object-specificity of cognition could not be explained.

Blue and its cognition are not different [from each other], because they are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyamāt*)—

that too seems to us like infants' talk. For the meaning of [the word] 'together' is inappropriate if [they are] identical.

'Together' is a relational term that expresses a connection between two or more items.

4.9.2 They are not apprehended by the same cognition.

Or if you intend the meaning of the logical reason (i.e. *sahopalambhaniyamāt*) to be 'because they are necessarily perceived by the same [cognition] (*ekopalambhaniyamāt*)', then this is an unestablished logical reason. [128]

If the meaning of the logical reason is 'because they are necessarily perceived together', it is not capable of establishing identity. If, in an attempt to avoid this problem, its meaning is asserted to be 'because they are necessarily perceived by the same cognition' a different logical problem arises, that of non-establishment in the proof-subject, namely blue and its cognition.

For at the moment of perceiving the perceived object such as blue, we do not perceive its perceiver (i.e. cognition). It has already been explained[129] that these [cognitions] such as 'This is blue' are nothing but the appearance of merely an external perceived object,

---

[128] Śāntarakṣita, though he does not use the expression *ekopalambhaniyama*, interprets the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument in this way (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 2029–2030):

> *yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam* |
> *tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate* ||
>
> *yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ* |
> *nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanam* [*vedanam* BBS edition, Tib. *he* 89a7; *vedanāt* GOS edition] ||
>
> *When the experience of A is necessarily the experience of B*, then A is not different from B, or cannot be separated from it, just like the own nature of a cognition of blue [from that cognition of blue] or just like the second moon [from the first]. *And this experience of a blue form is the experience of the cognition of blue.*

Italics mark expressions of the necessity of being perceived by the same cognition. Commenting on this, Kamalaśīla actually uses the expression *ekopalambhaniyama* (twice). We are not aware of any other evidence, however, of Jayanta knowing either Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla.

Kamalaśīla's commentary on these two verses reports the view of Śubhagupta that if 'perceived together' means 'perceived by the same (*eka*) cognition', then the logical reason is unestablished (*asiddha*). Jayanta's response to the argument thus resembles Śubhagupta's.

[129] He is probably referring back primarily to 4.1.3: "*idaṃ nīlam" iti grāhakād vicchinna eva grāhyākāro 'vabhāsate*. Other places where he has made related remarks are 4.2.4, 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.2.2. And there are parts of the text outside of this passage that are relevant, for example, from first *āhnika*: '*nīlam idam' iti hi saṃvedyate, na punaḥ 'pratyakṣam idam' iti* (*Nyāyamañjarī* I p. 83,11). 'For what we experience is "this is blue", and not "this is a perceptual cognition".'

which lacks penetration by the form of its perceiver, and which is distinct from that (perceiver).

And in some cases we even experience that we reflect on the perceiver alone (i.e. cognition), separated from the form of the perceived, in such a way as 'I do not remember; *some* object was grasped by me at that time.'

One is aware of a past cognition but not of the object cognized.

So because we are thus aware of the form of a cognition and the form of an object in separation from each other, how can you say that:

> Blue and its cognition are not different, because they are necessarily perceived by the same [cognition].

4.9.3 Vijñānavādins also accept the difference.

And it is this very distinction that you too refer to when you say 'blue and its cognition'.[130]

[Vijñānavādin:] This is a mere reference to the opponent's view.

[Naiyāyika:] [That is] not [so], for if they were identical, they could not even be referred to separately. For this reason too, this form does not belong to a cognition.

References

Primary Sources

Aṣṭādhyāyī — Katre, S. M. (ed.). *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1989.

Āgamaḍambara — Dezső, C. (ed.). *Much Ado About Religion, by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.* New York: New York University Press and the JJC Foundation 2005.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya — Śāstrī D. (ed.). *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra.* Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1987.

Granthibhaṅga — Shah, N. J. (ed.). *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga.* Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology 1972

[130] That two things are being spoken about is conveyed in the Sanskrit by the dual ending.

Tantrāloka	Shāstrī, M. K. (ed.). *The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with commentary by Rājānaka Jayaratha. Volume 7: Āhnikas 10–12.* Bombay 1924.
Tarkabhāṣā	Iyengar, H. R. R. (ed.). *Tarkabhasha and Vadasthana of Mokshakaragupta and Jitaripada.* Mysore 1944.
Tattvasaṅgraha	Shastri, D. (ed.). *Tattvasangraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla.* 2 Volumes. Bauddha Bharati Series 1, 2. Vārāṇasī 1981–1982.
Tattvasaṅgraha (GOS)	Krishnamacharya, E. (ed.). *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita: with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla.* 2 Volumes. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30, 31. Baroda 1926.
Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā	See *Tattvasaṅgraha.*
Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa	Shastri, M. K. (ed.). *Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Sadyojyotis with the Prakāśa Commentary of Rāmakaṇṭha.* Delhi 1989 (Original Edition Śrīnagar 1926).
Nyāyabhāṣya	Thakur, A. (ed.). *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. New Delhi, 1997.
Nyāyamañjarī	Varadacharya, K. S. (ed.). *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇi–Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor.* 2 Volumes. Mysore 1969 and 1983.
Nyāyamañjarī (KSS)	Śukla, S. N. (ed.). *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.* 2 Volumes. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Nyaya section, 15. Benares, 1934–1936.
Nyāyavārttika	Thakur, A. (ed.). *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara.* New Delhi 1997.
Pramāṇavārttika 3	Tosaki, H. (ed.). *Pramāṇavārttika III. Bukkyo-ninshikiron no kenkyu* [**Studies in Buddhist Epistemology*]. 2 Volumes. Tokyo: Daitoshuppansha 1979 and 1985.
Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti	Gnoli, R. (ed.). *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary.* Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente 1960.
Pramāṇaviniścaya	Steinkellner, E. (ed.). *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya; Chapters 1 and 2.* Vienna, Beijing: Austrian Academy of Sciences, China Tibetology Research Centre 2007.

Pramāṇasamuccaya	Steinkellner, E. (ed.). *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭīkā.* URL: http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last accessed 18 February 2010).
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti	The so-called *vṛtti* is likely to be part of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* itself; for references to it, see *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.
Mṛgendratantravṛtti	Śāstrī, M. K. (ed.). *The Śrī Mṛgendra Tantram: Vidyāpāda & Yogapāda, with the Commentary (-vṛtti) of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha.* KSTS 50. Bombay-Srinagar, 1930. (Reprint New Delhi 1982).
Vākyapadīyasvavṛtti	Iyer, K. A. S. (ed.). *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, with the Commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva, Kāṇḍa I.* Deccan College Monograph Series 32. Poona 1966.
Śābarabhāṣya	Frauwallner, E. (ed.). *Śabarasvāmi's Bhāṣyam zu den Mīmāṃsāsūtren 1.1.1–5: Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā.* Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 6. Wien 1968.
Ślokavārttika, vṛttikāragrantha	Śāstrī, S. K. R., Raja, K. K. & Thangaswamy, R. (eds.). *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa.* Madras: University of Madras 1971.
Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda	The verses cited in this article are based on Kataoka's draft edition of the *Śūnyavāda* chapter, but are given here without variants. The edition is based on the following two editions and four manuscripts.

Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra. Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978.

Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa. Ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Rev. K. Kunjuni Raja & R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras 1971.

Two manuscripts preserved in the British Library (India Office): No. 2149, Burnell 1449b; No. 7976, Burnell 3739.

A manuscript preserved in the National Archive, Kathmandu: No. 4-1299 (NGMPP A 64/3).

A manuscript preserved in the Sarasvati Mahal Library, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi: No. 29689.

Secondary Sources

Cardona, G. (1967–68) "*Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* in Indian Grammar." *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–32 (Dr. Raghavan Felicitation Volume), 313–352.

Dezső, C. (2005) See *Āgamaḍambara*.

Ganeri, J. (1999) "Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27, 469–483.

Gupta, B. (1963) *Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī*. Beitrage zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte des Orients 16. Walldorf-Hessen.

Hegde, R.D. (1983) "Bhaṭṭa Jayanta." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 64, 1-15.

Inami, M. (1999) "On the Determination of Causality." In Shoryu Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference. Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften 281. Wien: 131–154.

Jacobi, H. (1911) "The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmans." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 31, 1–29.

Kataoka, K. (2003) "Critical Edition of the *Vijñānādvaitavāda* Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*." *The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture* 144, 115–155.
An updated version of this edition has been made available by Kataoka at:
<http://www.lit.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~kkataoka/Kataoka/NMvijR.pdf>.

Kataoka, K. (2006) "Jayanta no Yuishiki Hihan: Nyāyamañjarī Ninshiki Ichigenron Hihan Wayaku." [An annotated Japanese translation of the *Vijñānādvaitavāda* Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*.] *Tetsugaku Nenpo* (Faculty of Letters, Kyushu University) 65, 39–85.

Kataoka, K. (2009) "A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*: The Buddhist Refutation of Kumarila's Criticism of Apoha." *The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture* 156, 498(1)-458(41).

Kellner, B. (2009–2010) "Towards a Critical Edition of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*." In Jürgen Hanneder and Philipp Maas (eds.), *Text Genealogy and Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens* 52–53, 161–211.

Kellner, B. (forthcoming A) "Self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *-vṛtti*. A close reading." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.

Kellner, B. (forthcoming B) "Self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) and infinite regresses: a comparison of arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.

Kher, C. V. (1992) *Buddhism as Presented by the Brahmanical Systems*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

Marui, H. (2006) "Some notes on the controversies between the '*ācāryāḥ*' and the '*vyākhyātāraḥ*' in the *Nyāyamañjarī*", *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 54(3), 33-41.

Oberhammer, G. (1962) "On the sources in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Uddyotakara." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 6, 91–150.

Schmithausen, L. (2007) *Ālayavijñāna; On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy.* Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series IVa. Tokyo.

Shah, N. J. (1992) *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī with Gujarati Translation.* Vol. 5. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology.

Shah, N. J. (1997) *A study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī; A Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic, Part III.* Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 4. Ahmedabad: Jagruti Dilip Sheth.

Staal, J. F. (1960) Review of D. S. Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne. Philosophy East and West* 10, 53–7.

Staal, J. F. (1966) "Contraposition in Indian Logic." In *Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science*, pp. 634-649.

Steinkellner, E. (2007) See *Pramāṇaviniścaya.*

Taber, J. (2005) *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception.* London: Routledge Curzon.

Taber, J. (forthcoming) "Kumārila's Buddhist." *Journal of Indian Philosophy.*

Teraishi, Y. (1997) "Kumārila no Dignāga Jūryōron Hihan—Tasha no Tameno Suiri wo Megutte—." *Nihon Tibet Gakkai Kaihō* 41/42, 61–69.

Tosaki, H. (1979, 1985) See *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.

Watson, A. (2006) *The Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self.* Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 32. Wien.

Watson, A. (forthcoming) "Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Elaboration of Self-Awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), and how it differs from Dharmakīrti's Exposition of the Concept." *Journal of Indian Philosophy.*

Wezler, A. (1975) "Zur Identität der '*Ācāryāḥ*' und '*Vyākhyātāraḥ*' in Jayantabhaṭṭas *Nyāyamañjarī*", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 19, 135-146.

Keywords: Jayanta, Vijñānavāda, Nyāya, Dharmakīrti, Yogācāra, Nyāyamañjarī, Kumārila

[i] The *ayam* is awkward. It is not in all witnesses, but we have retained it partly because we have trusted C_1 here, our best manuscript. Perhaps the intention is, 'If this form that appears is just one ...'.

[ii] We have left the *hi* untranslated, since it is difficult to see how to render it without 'overtranslating'. The Vijñānavādin uses it to introduce an explanation of why he has just responded to the opponent with a sarcastic insult.

[iii] *vaidhurya* at the end of compounds occurs commonly, including in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, in the sense of 'absence of', but it clearly cannot mean that here. For this sense of 'inconvenienced by' see *Nyāyamañjarī* I p. 272,3-4, where hallucinations of a loved or missed woman, arising from repeated inculcation of love or grief, are said to be illusory because they/the person having them is inconvenienced by a subsequent refuter (*bādhaka*) of the hallucination: *kāmaśokādibhāvanābhyāsabhuvāṃ pratibhāsānāṃ bādhakavaidhuryād aprāmāṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati* (Kataoka 2006: 75, note 19).

Although in his original edition Kataoka (2003: 128) opted for the reading *pratibandhavaidhuryāt*, by the time of his Japanese translation (2006: 75, note 19) he saw more evidence in favour of *pratibandhakavaidhuryāt*. There is the parallel *bādhakavaidhuryād* in the just cited passage, the fact that 'incovenienced by' suggests an agent, the fact that the *Ślokavārttika* 'source' verse here reads *pratibandhakayogāt*, the fact that the best of the manuscripts collated, C_1, reads *pratibandhaka-* at this place, and the fact that in the next sentence *pratibandhako* is well attested. At that place however, the one witness which does not read *pratibandhako* is C_1, which reads *pratibandho*. So we cannot use *both* of the last of these two points as evidence for *pratibandhaka-*.

[iv] Although the reading of M and N, *gṛhyamāṇam*, is simpler, the causative *grāhyamāṇam* is well attested in the other witnesses, so we attempt to give it sense with this translation 'being necessarily grasped', i.e. being caused/forced to be grasped by the force of the preceding arguments.

[v] Note the alliterative patterns in *katham akhilataditarapadārthaparihāreṇa kevalanīlānulagnatām avalambeta*.

[vi] *prekṣāpūrva*, more literally, 'after [proper] consideration'.

[vii] Note the alliteration in the compound *ālokalocanādikārakāntarajanitatvasya*.

[viii] We leave the *eva* untranslated because we see no other option that would not be an overtranslation.

[ix] The Sanskrit is slightly awkward, in that *ye tu* is not picked up subsequently by a co-relative; the change of speaker comes at the beginning of 3.4.2 with *tad idam anupapannam*.

[x] Note the alliteration in *-anuraktasphaṭikaśakalāvalokanāt*.

[xi] Literally, 'a non-completion', 'a non-termination'.

[xii] We take *tat* to refer to *svaprakāśasākārajñāna*.

[xiii] Jayanta uses the compound *anādyavidyāvāsanā-* twice in this passage and at least two other times elsewhere in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. It makes little difference whether we interpret the *anādi-* as qualifying *avidyā* or *vāsanā*, for both the ignorance and the latent impressions are beginningless. Jayanta elsewhere uses both *anādyavidyā* and *anādivāsanā*. Here we take it as qualifying *vāsanā* because we have just had *avidyāvāsanā* as one unit in the previous sentence, and because in his summary of this passage at the beginning of the next paragraph he uses just *anādivāsanā-*.

[xiv] The monk in the *Āgamaḍambara*, when explaining Vijñānavāda, uses a sentence with much the same vocabulary as this one: see *tasmād vijñānamātram evedaṃ harṣaviṣādādyanekarūparūṣitam anādiprabandhapravṛttavicitravāsanānusārasamāsāditavitatākārabhedam amunā nairātmyādi-*

bhāvanāmārgeṇa vyapanītavividhopādhipaṭalopahitanānākārakāluṣyam amalasaṃvinmātraniṣṭham (p. 42–44).

[xv] Since the point is presumably that there is a beginningless chain of cognition, latent impression, cognition, latent impression, etc. the dual ending of *santānayoḥ* is slightly awkward. A singular ending indicating a single stream consisting of both would suffice. We attempt to make sense of the transmitted reading by inserting '[corresponding]'.

[xvi] Our translation 'involving' as a rendering of the compound relationship between *pramāṇapramеyapramiti-* and *vyavahāraḥ* is vague: it could cover locative ('with regard to'), instrumental ('by means of'), or various senses of the genitive (e.g. 'related to').

As stated in footnote 80, part of the background of this remark is a discussion at the beginning of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*: *tatra yasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārthaṃ pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo 'rthaḥ pramīyate tat prameyam, yad arthavijñānaṃ sā pramitiḥ, catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu tattvaṃ* {variant: *arthatattvaṃ*} *parisamāpyate* (1,13–15).

Nārayaṇakaṇṭha commenting on *Mṛgendratantra, vidyāpāda* 2.13 writes, *yad āha ākṣapādaḥ, 'catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu sarvo 'pi vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate'*. Thus he must have known a version of the last sentence of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* passage given above that read instead of *tattvaṃ parisamāpyate, vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate,* which is what we have in the *Nyāyamañjarī* sentence under discussion.

Jayanta knew the version with *tattvam parisamāpyate*: *evaṃ ca yad ucyate 'pramātā pramāṇaṃ prameyaṃ pramitir iti catasṛṣu vidhāsu tattvaṃ parisamāpyate', iti tad vyāhanyate* (*Nyāyamañjarī* I, p. 32,6–7). But that he also knew the version with *vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate* is plausible given the following sentence from his commentary on the passage: *tad ayam iha pramāṇaṃ pramātā prameyaṃ pramitir iti caturvarga eva* vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate* (Vol. 1, 38,8–9). So his formulation of the present sentence in our passage seems to have been influenced by the *Nyāyabhāṣya* discussion.

* The Mysore edition reads *caturvarga eva*, the KSS edition *caturvargeṇaiva*. The locative is supported by the reading of the Lucknow MS, *caturvarge eva*, where the reason for the non-application of sandhi was probably to disambiguate the locative from the nominative. To have *parisamāpyate* here connected with a locative would, furthermore, make this sentence consistent with both the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (*catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu*) and the present sentence in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*jñāna eva caikatra*).

[xvii] One of the motives for filling the compound out with unrequired extra words such as *vilāsa* is the alliteration: *anādyavidyāvāsanāvilāsaviparyāsitatattvadarśanatayā*.

[xviii] On the compound *anādyavidyāvāsanā-* see note xiii. Here we interpret the *anādi* as qualifying *avidyā* because of the *avidyāviratau tu* at the beginning of the next sentence.

[xix] Evidence for *vaidhuryāt* giving a reason for just the claim of the second *pāda* (rather than for that of the first two or for that of the fourth) is provided by: 1) the auto-commentary to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* verse (see *tatrāpi grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt*); 2) the fact that the first *pāda* is just concluding the topic of the previous section of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*—only from the second *pāda* on is a new point made; 3) the parallel verse in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (3:327): *nānyo 'nubhāvyas tenāsti tasya nānubhavo 'paraḥ | tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt tat svayaṃ tat prakāśate* || 'There is nothing else that is experienced by that [cognition]; there is no other experience of it [either], because that [experience] too is susceptible to the same refutation [as has just been used against the external object]. Therefore (*tat*) it (i.e. cognition) (*tat*) shines forth by itself.' Although the third *pāda* reads differently, it is clear that it too gives a reason just for the claim of the second *pāda*. We thank Birgit Kellner for this information. On the reading *tat svayaṃ tat prakāśate* for *svayam saiva prakāśate*, the reading of the editions, see Kellner (2009: 196–198).

[xx] We prefer not to interpret this compound as a *bahuvrīhi*. Although compounds ending in *āt-man* are far more commonly *bahuvrīhis* than *tatpuruṣas*, Dharmakīrti sometimes uses them as *tat-puruṣas*. See for example *buddhyātmā* in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:44 (= *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:353), which Jayanta has just cited above in section 3.8, and which thus may have influenced his formulation here. See also the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* ad 1:43 (p. 26,4) where Dharmakīrti comments on the phrase in his verse *ekasyārthasvabhāvasya* with the sentence *eko hy arthātmā*. That *arthātmā* is a *tatpuruṣa* is clear from the fact that there is no other word with which it is agreeing.

[xxi] That *prakāśakabodha-* is a *karmadhāraya* is implied by *bodhasya tu tadgrāhakasya* in the next sentence (from the sense there it is clear that the genitives are *samānādhikaraṇa*). Furthermore if the compound meant 'cognition of the illuminator' the meaning here would be absolutely contrary to Jayanta's intention: he wants to *deny* that grasping an object depends on cognizing its illuminator.

[xxii] There is no need to conjecture a different reading in which we have the nominative *katarat* instead of *katarasya*; *katarasyāvabhāsituṃ yuktam* is not grammatically incorrect.

[xxiii] Although *prakāśate* is better attested, we prefer *prakāśyate*, the reading of the BHU manuscript, for we see this sentence as analyzing the *rūpaṃ prakāśyate* mentioned in the previous sentence.

[xxiv] That *upalambhotpāda* (pre-sandhi) is a nominative, not a locative, is suggested by the nominative *upalambhadṛṣṭiḥ* later in the sentence.

[xxv] That *tadutpāda* (pre-sandhi) is a nominative, not a locative, is suggested by the nominative *tadgrahaṇam* later in the sentence.

[xxvi] *yat tvayaiva ca dūṣitam* is awkward. Without the *ca*, the *yat* would be fine. With the *ca*, it would be smoother if we read *tat*, not *yat*. We are reluctant to gloss over the problem by simply adopting the *tat* that is found in M and C1, for *yat* is the reading not only of the majority of the witnesses, but also of the *Granthibhaṅga*. Although it is possible that the editor of the *Granthibhaṅga* did not accurately follow his manuscript here, it seems to us just as possible that *tat* is a secondary 'correction'.

[xxvii] Although Jayanta clearly used *prakāśana* in section 4.4.1.2 above to convey a non-causative, intransitive meaning ('shining forth', 'appearing', 'being manifest'), in fact precisely to *contrast* with a causative meaning ('illuminating something', 'making something manifest'), he has used the word three times in the last two sentences in a causative sense.

[xxviii] The metre is Upendravajrā, but the last *pāda* is unmetrical. It should have eleven syllables, ending short, long, long, but it has twelve, ending short, long, short, long; its penultimate syllable is superfluous.

[xxix] Although we have decided to use here a separate English sentence, *tatra* in the Sanskrit is obviously the co-relative of the *yat*.

[xxx] We take *yadā* at the beginning of the first half-verse as correlating with *tatra* in the last.

[xxxi] We construe the sentence as *tatsadasattvena taddhiyas tathātvam iti vetti*: 'one knows the *tathātvam* of cognition of him ...'

[xxxii] We take *tatra niyamasiddhi-* to be synonymous with the earlier used expression *pratikarma-vyavasthāsiddhi-* (4.8.1), so that *tatra* = *tasminn arthe*.

[xxxiii] We are interpreting *etena* as *tajjanyatvena niyamasiddhyā*.

[xxxiv] The majority of witnesses do not contain the double *na*, but it is hard to derive a satisfactory sense without it.